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Abstract: 
 
This thesis aims at investigating the determinants and the effects of R&D investments in a panel 
data of Norwegian medium and large firms from year 1995 to 2005. There is evidence of cash 
constraints in the R&D expenditures, but they were less strong for beginning R&D. There is an 
almost proportional relationship between R&D and sales, suggesting that the externality 
reduction and the economies of scale for big firms are likely as strong as the alleged diminishing 
returns to scale and the burocratic inefficiencies of large organizations. Firms of low-intensive 
sectors rely much more on sales and liquidity than the high-intensive sectors. Being foreign does 
not have a significant impact on R&D if the firm invests, but it has a negative impact on the 
probability of investing, suggesting the existence of sunk costs in beginning R&D. 
 
It can be shown that R&D Granger-causes physical investment, while the opposite does not hold. 
This confirms the story of Lach-Schankerman and Lach-Rob, who see R&D as a random 
innovation process that creates innovations randomly. These, in order to be profitable, must be 
embodied in physical capital. 
 
R&D has some effects in increasing sales volume, while it does not show significant effects on 
profitability. In the high-intensive sectors, anyway, these relations seem stronger. 
This analysis can convey policy implications, especially for the sunk costs argument and the 
foreign ownership. 
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Introduction: Research questions 
 
The purpose of this work is to investigate the relationship between R&D and its determinants and 
its impact on firm's success. I will use a detailed dataset of economy-wide firms active in Norway 
since 1995 to 2005. The focus on the determinants will stress the most discussed arguments in the 
literature, like the relationship between size, profits, liquidity and R&D, or between firm's sector 
and R&D. There will also be an analysis of the R&D pattern in time as well as an analysis of the 
foreign ownership on R&D. 
 
The relationship between size and R&D was found to be different from work to work. In 
particular, the two leading alternatives are the proportional (Cohen-Klepper, 1996, Klepper, 
1996, Klette-Griliches 2000, Klette-Kortum (2001)) and the diminishing relationship (Jaruzelski, 
2005), where size is measured with sales revenues. Profits and liquidity could also impact R&D 
expenditures, especially if its expected returns are uncertain (past good results can adjust them 
upwards) or if there are liquidity constraints, which are more likely to occur for small firms. 
R&D can have different roles in the different sectors and it may have had a particular trend in 
time. Foreign ownership also can impact the total invested amount, provided that firms invest, as 
well as the probability of investing. Fors and Svensson (2000) find that Swedish multinational 
firms prefer to invest just in Sweden, while Prasad (2004) finds that multinational firms are 
increasing their R&D expenditures in foreign countries. Foreign ownership can have an effect on 
R&D if there are sunk costs in beginning R&D (Santos, 2008) or for the cheaper Norwegian 
high-skilled labor. These findings may have interesting policy implications. 
 
I will discuss whether it will be possible to build up one single model both for the investing firms 
as well as for the not investing ones. The natural candidates are the Tobit model (Tobit, 1958) or 
the Heckman two-step procedure (Heckman, 1979). The alternative is to analyze R&D 
investments through a two-part model (Manning, Duan and Rogers, 1987). I will analyze the 
advantages and the drawbacks of both. 
 
After having analyzed the determinants of R&D investments but before analyzing its effects on 
the success indicators of a firm, like profitability, increase in sales etc, I will analyze the relations 
between the tangible and the untangible investments, i.e. physical capital and R&D. Some 
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literature point out the causality from R&D to physical investments (Lach-Schankerman, 1989, 
Lach-Rob, 1996),  the other way round (Tovainen-Stoneman, 1998) or a two-way relationship 
(Chiao, 2001). I will try to answer also to this question for the case of Norway. The causality 
from R&D to investments has its roots in Lach and Schankerman's theory of R&D as a random 
innovation process. This process randomly generates potentially profitable innovations that, in 
order to be actually profitable, must be embodied in physical capital. This implies that the 
variance of physical investments is higher than the variance of the R&D. R&D, indeed, is 
performed just on the expected value of its returns, while capital investments are triggered by a 
useful innovation. On the other hand, even if technological opportunities can stimulate physical 
investments, R&D may not be the best indicator for it, due to spillovers. Indeed, Tovainen and 
Stoneman (1998) found the opposite relationship. I will try to shed some light on this issue too. 
 
Finally, I investigate the effects of R&D on firm's success. A common place is that R&D will 
give competitive advantage and improve firm's performance, but a large empirical literature (Von 
Braun, 1996, Kandybin-Kihn, 2004, Jaruzelski, 2005) seems to contradict it. Some relationship 
was found just for the increase in sales volume (Jaruzelski, 2005), but not for profits nor other 
indicators. Unfortunately the dataset I analyze does not have any measure for innovation 
(patents). So I will have to analyze the relationship between R&D and sales growth or profits, 
without an intermediate measure for innovation. I will analyze whether there is a different 
relationship in Norway and to which extent the existing literature finds support or contradictions. 
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1     Innovation and R&D 
 
Innovation and technological changes were always thought to be the motors of economic growth. 
Innovation can be defined as “the ability to define and develop new products and services and 
deliver them to the market” (Bordia et al., 2005) and a “highly cross-functional activity” 
(ibidem). This definition conveys the meaning of R&D from the point of view of the firm, but it 
does not take into account its basic importance in growth. For the firms this is just one of the 
many management's instruments to improve firm's performances, but from a global point of view 
this is the most basic tool to allow long-term economic progress. Sena (2004), on the contrary, 
defines innovation as “the engine that drives the growth machine of modern capitalist 
economies”. Linking these two definitions, that consider the two opposite features of innovation, 
we can understand both the incentives to develop it (in Bordia) and its consequences on the 
whole economy (in Sena).  
 
Innovation entered all the modern dynamic macroeconomic models, since the influencial  
considerations of Schumpeter (1950), passing through the initial formalizations of Solow's model 
(1956), and finally arriving to the endogenous growth theory and the knowledge economy models 
(Romer, 1990, Grossmann-Helpman, 1991, Aghion-Howitt, 1992, Jones, 1995). Schumpeter's 
view of innovation is dynamic too, even if not mathematically formalised, as he focused on the 
“creative destruction”, the process that leads to innovation and the evolution of industries 
(Malerba, 2005). In spite of that, Schumpeterian view was afterwards intended in a static way, 
giving more importance to market structure and firm size (ibidem). Much of the analysis, indeed, 
carried out in order to test the “Schumpeterian predictions” had not much in common with the 
spirit of his work. The good thing is that now we have a huge literature about the relationships 
between R&D, innovation and firm size. 
 
One of the most popular statements related to him is that the most important innovations have 
been performed by very large firms, many times monopolists. This is quite at odds with classical 
microeconomic theory. While competitive firms have the largest incentives to innovate, 
monopolists have larger funds and so can finance more easily their own efforts. 
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Especially if credit markets are imperfect, these two issues has an opposite impact, so many 
papers were devoted to disentangle these two effects and to see which one was stronger. 
The other path of innovation literature deals with endogenous growth models. One main 
assumption is that technology is a public good, or at least non-rival and partially excludable 
(Romer, 1990, Jones, 1995, Arnold, 2005), but the conclusions of these theories were in some 
sense similar to Solow's most important prediction: savings and physical investment are not able 
to explain sustained economic growth. The only variable that can do that is technology. 
This is the reason why innovation and R&D have allured such a wide interest from economists, 
politics and public opinion. In the so-called Lisbon agenda there was even a commitment to 
develop policies and provide basis for an economy in which knowledge would be the driving 
force of economic growth (Segarra, 2007). One of the main reasons to develop a public policy for 
R&D is the main economic argument of the externalities. R&D is mainly information and so it 
has the characteristics of a public good (Arrow, 1962, Sena, 2004), so there are spillovers 
(Aghion-Howitt, 1992, Sena, 2004) that can affect R&D spending. In industrial organization 
theory, as they are positive, they will lead to a suboptimal outcome. 
 
But R&D is not just information. as Cohen and Levinthal point out (1989), R&D is information 
but also it “enhances firm's ability to assimilate and exploit existing information”.  From a 
theoretical point of view is not clear a priori whether R&D expenditures are larger or smaller 
than the optimum. Even admitting that they are smaller, designing a good policy is not 
straightforward at all. Villard (1958) suggests the government to give subsidies for R&D, but 
thirty years later Acs and Audretsch (1988) found, consistently with Griliches (1986), that 
government-financed R&D is much less productive than private R&D. They found that, in USA, 
the correlation between private R&D and innovation (the sum between product and process 
innovation) was 0.746, but it was just 0.481 between total R&D and it. Government-financed 
R&D, then, conveys the risk of being an unproductive expense and they may also change the 
relative expenditure between basic and applied R&D. A subsidy to R&D has, as all subsidies, a 
substitution and an income effect. If the income effect is strong enough, all firms may be willing 
to play more defensively. They may want to focus more on small and certain innovations rather 
than uncertain but potentially large ones (Rosen, 1991). This may lead to a pattern with less 
revolutionary innovations. 
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Furthermore, and maybe more troublesome, the characteristics of R&D makes it difficult to 
design a competition policy for the innovative markets. Markets in which technological change is 
important are never perfectly competitive (Stiglitz et al., 1987). Technology, indeed, is basically 
knowedge, so it suffers from imperfect information (Stoneman-Diederen, 1994). This is the 
reason why R&D and its implications are very difficult to treat with the basic neoclassical tools, 
in particular when it comes to design R&D policy. Competition effects, as well as social gain, are 
not clearcut at all. These intriguing characteristic of R&D and innovation reflect the many ways 
they have been treated.  
 
Firstly, the empirical literature focused on input-oriented innovation indicators in analysing the 
impact of innovation on firm's productivity (Segarra, 2007). In this setting, the production 
function approach predominated. R&D was proposed to be entered in the knowledge production 
function and was treated like a normal input (Griliches, 1979). The aim was also at calculating 
the output elasticity of R&D (Mansfield, 1965, Griliches, 1973). Secondly, the number of patents 
was used as a measure of innovative output, or in absolute value (Scherer, 1965, Griliches, 1990, 
Klette, 2001) or divided by R&D investments (Cohen-Klepper, 1992). Finally, other studies 
attempted to embody the quality of innovations rather than their quantity, using the number of 
citations collected by a patent (Jaffe-Trajtenberg, 2005). Yet, despite all these efforts, no measure 
of innovation receives the favors of all the economic world. 
  
As well as for R&D policy design, also R&D output  rises many questions. 
Many other economists, indeed, do not belong to the preceding categories. Rogers (2006), for 
example, uses the ratio added value/R&D in assessing R&D productivity, while many others 
(Jaruzelski et al., 2005, Von Braun, 1997, Kandybin-Kihn, 2004) simply treat R&D as an input in 
the production. They analyse its relationship with the most common success indicators of a firm, 
like profits, increase in sales and increase in profits. Klette and Kortum (2001), as a final caveat, 
suggest not to believe in the possible positive relationships between R&D and productivity (in 
their paper it is the number of patents), as it is just weakly correlated with the more important 
correlation between R&D and innovations. 
 
We can easily see that this jungle of definitions and suggests (in how to assess R&D 
productivity) is well far from being cut down. But this is just the “magic” of the creative process. 
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 R&D is a risky process that does not guarantee results. Firms, nevertheless, have good reasons to 
try. An innovation can permit to enter a new market, to lower production costs, to expand its own 
market share, even to follow some anticompetitive strategies, like creating barriers to entry 
(Mueller-Tilton, 1969, Robinson-Chiang, 1996) or making the firm enjoy some monopoly power. 
This can be achieved both through a large product innovation or through practices on the border 
on legality, like patenting each minimal change with respect to its own product. Xerox did like 
that in the 60's and 70's (Cabral, 2002). In this way, the potential entrants would have to spend 
more R&D than the necessary in order to acquire information about the technology and to invent 
around existing patents (Mueller-Tilton, 1969).  
 
 
 
1.1. Determinants of R&D 
 
Large part of the literature is devoted to analyse which kind of firms should be the most 
interested in R&D. Starting from Schumpeter, many analyses were carried out both from a 
theoretical and a practical point of view. “Second Schumpeter”’s favour for large firms is well 
known and many others followed his theory (or, better, the static version of his theory). Hamberg 
(1964) underlines that R&D should come from the biggest firms, as they have more financial 
strength and so they can support many projects simultaneously. This can let them spread the risk 
and appropriate more easily the uncertain outcomes of R&D, as they have more products. Having 
a higher output volume, they can also spread the cost on a higher sales basis and reap more 
private advantages (Cohen-Klepper, 1996). Furthermore, a strong market position (a concentrated 
oligopoly) can make the firm enjoy the possible cost reduction on a larger sales volume, making 
it more convenient for a large firm to invest in R&D (ibid.). Klepper (1996) also focuses on the 
appropriability of returns from innovation. His reasoning is that the bigger the firm, the more it 
can appropriate its own R&D efforts. So we should expect not only a positive relationship 
between R&D and size, but, if this were the only effect, an increasing relationship between the 
ratio R&D/sales and size too. In particular, we would see an increase in process R&D. This 
finding is also confirmed in the paper of Cohen and Klepper quoted above. Here they construct a 
model that, under reasonable hypotheses, yields that process innovations have proportional 
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returns with size, while product innovations have less than proportional returns. The reason is 
that a process innovation, like a unity cost reduction, is very difficult to sell to another firm. A 
process innovation is intrinsically embodied in the heart of the firm and it will have a value as 
high as the unity saving multiplied by the quantity sold. A product innovation, on the other hand, 
can create a new market or induce a competition similar to Chamberlin's monopolistic 
competition (1933) and it is also much easier to sell. In all of these circumstances this is 
relatively more attractive for a small firm than for a large one.  
 
These findings are consistent with other papers: Mansfield(1981) reports that large firms have a 
higher ratio basic/risky R&D than small firms and that, in large firms, the increase in basic R&D 
is more than proportional with size, while risky R&D grows less than proportionally. Rosen 
(1991), in a theoretical article (like Cohen and Klepper's one), shows that large firms have more 
incentives to invest in safer R&D than small competitors. This can be linked to “replacement 
effect” theory (Tirole, 1988, Reinganum, 1985), for which an incumbent would invest less than 
its potential competitors as, in case of a drastic innovation, it would simply replace itself. A good 
compromise is that incumbents invest relatively less in product innovation, i.e. the type of R&D 
that can cause drastic innovations, than process innovation with respect to small firms. This is 
what happens in reality. Also incumbents, that normally are much bigger than potential 
competitors, have more incentives in investing in basic R&D: this is where most of the spillovers 
occur (Scherer, 1965). So, the bigger the market share, the bigger the efforts in basic R&D. 
 
From a social point of view, a monopolist will not necessarily hurt welfare in a technological 
intensive market. The monopolist will produce less quantity, which makes R&D less than in a 
perfectly competitive market, but there are not spillovers, so it will invest much faster. This can 
lead even to more innovations and a faster growth in economy (Jovanovic-Lach, 1989). 
Imagining then that total R&D is a good proxy for innovation, and assuming that innovation is a 
desirable thing, many other researchers tried to understand which market structure was more 
adapt to enhance R&D and which public policies could improve these outcomes. Dasgupta and 
Stiglitz (1980) in a theoretical paper affirm that, at low levels of concentration, an increase of it 
would benefit total R&D expenditures. At high levels, on the contrary, an increase would dampen 
it. The shape of R&D with respect to concentration will be then like an inverse “U”. So the best 
market structure for R&D is the “competitive oligopoly” (ibid., Worley, 1961, Adams, 1979, 
 9
Villard, 1959). Adams supports this conclusion in his empirical paper, stating that R&D intensity 
(i.e. the ratio R&D/sales) in medium firms is higher than both in small and large ones. The 
reasons can be listed as: 1) Spillovers, 2) Small firms prefer to have informal R&D, 3) Big firms 
have more inefficiencies.  
 
 
 
1.2. Policy issues 
 
These three issues pose important challenges for the government. How should an optimal policy 
be designed? Some authors analysed the impact of the typical subsidies, some others the possible 
relaxations of antitrust policies to allow for R&D cooperative agreements. Spencer and Brander 
(1983) assess the importance of subsidies to R&D also for considerations of industrial strategy. 
They found an important correlation between foreign sales and R&D expenditures. If we set up a 
game where the players are the government, whose objective is maximizing domestic welfare, 
and the foreign firms, the government will have the incentive to subsidize R&D, as this will have 
a similiar effect to subsidize exports. This is interesting especially if subsidizing exports is 
prohibited by international agreements. A study of OECD (1985), quoted in Le (1987), confirms 
that an increase in R&D, with respect to the total value added, has a significant effect in the share 
of high-technology products in export. Tomiura (2004) found support for these findings also in a 
dataset of Japanese firms. He founds that internal R&D is strongly correlated with exports in the 
science-based sector. Brod and Shivakumar (1997) showed, anyway, that R&D subsidies create 
problems of moral hazard. They suggest then to rely more on cooperation agreements: in this way 
government avoids spillovers as well as cost duplication (firms can create synergies and even 
spread the risk). This comes at a price, which is the risk of collusion, but if spillovers are 
sufficiently big, benefits outweight this drawback. Otherwise, if spillovers are negligible, R&D 
cooperation can reduce total R&D, as firms will try to soften the product market competition 
intensity (ibid.). Also Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998) underline this problem, in particular for R&D 
Joint Ventures. Barlevy (2006), finally, claims the existence of a dynamic externality which make 
the firms short-sighted, making R&D expenditures more procyclical than the optimal. The 
opportunity cost of growth is lower during recessions, so policies aimed at encouraging R&D 
should be more active during the troughs of the economy. 
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 In order to design an optimal policy, nevertheless, it is necessary to have an idea of the 
quantitative effect of the issues mentioned above. How much does a small firm prefer to carry out 
informal R&D? How much big firms are affected by inefficiences? 
These will be two of the questions addressed in this work. 
 
 
 
1.3. Foreign ownership 
 
Another question of interest, which received very little attention in the literature, is the possible 
effect of foreign ownership on R&D. From existing literature we know the trends and the reasons 
why a firm invests in a foreign country. Trend in foreign R&D expenditures showed a positive 
and large pattern in US: R&D spending by U.S. affiliates of foreign companies more than 
doubled from $6.5 billion in 1987 to $17.2 billion in 1996. It grew at an average annual rate of 
11.6% per year since 1987. In fact, R&D expenditures by foreign companies in the United States 
have grown much faster than total R&D expenditures by U.S.-owned firms within the United 
States. (Serapio-Dalton, 1999). 
 
The reasons why a firm invests in R&D in a foreign country can be, following Narula and Zanfei 
(2003), to respond to different demand and market conditions across locations. So the firms need 
to adapt their existing product and process technologies through foreign-located R&D. 
However, supply factors and the need to gain access to local competencies have become an 
increasingly important motivation to engage in asset-augmenting R&D abroad. This is due, 
inter alia, to the “growing tendency for multi-technology products, and to the fact that patterns 
of technological specialisation are distinct across countries, despite the economic and 
technological convergence associated with economic globalisation” (ibid.). 
As a result, there is a growing mismatch between what home locations can provide and 
what firms require. In general, innovation systems and technological specialisation of countries 
change only very gradually, and – especially in newer, rapidly evolving sectors - much more 
slowly than the technological needs of firms. So, firms must seek either to import and acquire the 
technology they need from abroad, or venture abroad and seek to internalise aspects of other 
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countries’ innovation systems. Thus, in addition to proximity to markets and production units, 
firms also venture abroad to seek new sources of knowledge, which are associated with the 
innovation system of the host region. Kuemmerle (2005) had similar ideas. In his opinion, firms 
create foreign R&D centres “to acquire new knowledge and augment the firm’s home base, or in 
order to apply existing knowledge to local markets and manufacturing facilities and thus to 
exploit the firm’s knowledge base”. But this was just the results of a questionnaire survey and an 
interview with senior executives in the company, and performed just in the pharmaceutical and 
electronic sector. Arvanitis and Hollenstein (2006), analyzing Swiss firms' foreign R&D, found 
that the reasons why a firm invests in foreign R&D are almost the ones that determine the total 
amount invested. They do not report, nevertheless, whether foreign firms invest, ceteris paribus, 
as much as a national firm. Le (1987), in a survey of Canadian high-technology firms, reports that 
foreign firms invest much less than national ones on average, while Rogers (2006) affirms that 
foreign firms do not have a premium in R&D rate of return. One reason why foreign firms could 
be willing to invest in R&D in Norway is that highly skilled labour is relatively cheap, compared 
to other countries, due to the compression of the wages.  
 
I will analyze on my dataset the impact of the foreign dummy on the expected R&D investment, 
both on the decision whether investing and on the invested amount. In doing so, we can also find 
clues to answer to Sutton (1991) and Santos' (2008) argument of very high sunk costs for 
beginning R&D. Sutton, in his book “Sunk Costs and Market Structure”, addresses the problem 
of sunk costs in various industries, among them in R&D-intensive ones. Santos analyzes a sample 
of Portuguese firms in the moulds industry and, by assuming optimizing behaviour, he concludes 
that fixed R&D costs are nearly 1.7 times the average yearly firm sales. If foreign investing firms 
invested the same quantity as a national firm, but the ratio of foreign investing firms on the total 
of foreign firms were lower than the ratio of national investing firms on the national ones (i.e. if 
E[R&D| foreign, R&D>0]=E[R&D| national, R&D>0 but P(R&D>0| foreign]<P(R&D>0| 
national]), then we would have a strong argument to support the sunk costs argument. On the 
contrary, if the probability that a foreign firm invests is the same as the probability that a national 
one does, the strength of the sunk costs argumentation would be reduced. Indeed, foreign 
multinational probably already invest in their own country. They may not want to duplicate the 
start-up costs. 
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1.4 Effects of R&D 
 
The discussion about the determinants of R&D will be coupled with the analysis of its effects. 
Parisi et al. (2005), in a survey on Italian manufacturing firms tracked from 1995 to 1998, find 
that R&D is closely related with the probability of introducing a product innovation, while fixed 
capital spending is related to introducing a process innovation. These results seem quite logical, 
but a more important point was found in other researchs. The productivity of larger firms, i.e. 
innovations per R&D dollar, is lower than small firms (Cohen-Klepper, 1992). But the reason, for 
the authors, is not an inefficiency of big firms, but the fact that, as they can appropriate more their 
own efforts, they invest more, and so R&D marginal productivity decreases. This can be the 
reason why small firms seem more productive. In the view of the authors, their R&D productivity 
is higher just because they stop before. We can imagine it with a Cobb-Douglas production 
function: both labor and capital have a marginal productivity negatively related with, 
respectively, labor and capital. The same could be for R&D. 
 
On the other side, nevertheless, also other views hold. Yeaple (1992) reports that, in twentyfive 
interviews with R&D managers in both large and small companies, they agreed that a large 
company typically spends from three to ten times as much as a small one to develop a particolar 
product. Theorically Cohen and Klepper's theory and Yeaple's findings could hold together, but it 
seems difficult that the increase in private gains due to size are so high as to compensate this 
productivity loss. Cohen (1995) states that innovation is more productive in large firms as a result 
of complementarities between R&D and other functional activities, such as marketing and 
manufacturing. Link (1981), in a dataset of US manufacturing firms, found a positive relationship 
between returns on R&D and firm size. 
 
Other authors have an opposite view. Scherer and Ross (1990) think that R&D productivity is 
undermined in large firms because of loss of marginal control, or through excessive bureaucracy. 
Griliches (1980) found no significant evidence of increasing returns in R&D to firm size, just 
with the exception of chemical and petroleum industries. Graves and Langowiz (1993), together 
with Acs and Audretsch (1988), found evidence for decreasing returns to scale in R&D. Cohen 
and Klepper (1996, b) had the same results, while they found that R&D expenditures were 
proportional to sales, like Klette and Griliches (2000). The research of many decades ago gave 
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similar result too. Scherer, in 1965, found that the five hundred largest corporations, in year 1955, 
exhibited a decreasing relationship between patents and size too.  
 
In all these studies the measure for innovation was the number of patents, or patents to R&D 
ratios (with the exception of Griliches). So, even using the same measure for innovation, there are 
still two opposite views. Furthermore, patents are just an intermediate stage in the process of 
transforming research inputs into benefits (Pakes-Griliches, 1984), not the final outcome. This is 
a very important point: in practice, many patents can be registered for just one innovation (the 
Xerox case), or, on the contrary, a product or process improvement may be not patented. Further 
to these serious problems, “the use of patent counts as a measure of innovation output does not 
provide direct evidence to show the innovative impact on a firm's competitive advantage” (Tsai-
Wang, 2005). Scherer (1965), in his research, goes further: interpreting the profitability of any 
patent as a random variable with some probability distribution, he found that it is highly skewed 
toward the low private value, with a very long tail into the high value side. It can be well 
approximated by a Pareto distribution with a coefficient k of less than 0.5. Its expected value is   
E[X]=kx(1)/(k-1), where x(1) is the smallest observation in the sample, and exists just for k>1. So   
neither the mean nor the variance exist. In addition to the problem that there is not a 1:1 
relationship between innovations and patents (we can call it “input-throughput problem”), 
analysing productivity or profitability through the number of patents shows another problem too 
(we can name it as “throughput-output problem”). A way to deal with that could be to cut, in 
some point, the profits distribution of patents, eliminating the cause of the infinite mean. But this 
would be like limiting the number of coin tosses in a St.Petersburg game, taking away the most 
valuable tail of the distribution. These can be the inventions that open up new markets and 
technologies. Also Sanders (1962) contests the measurement of inventive activity through the 
number of patents. 
 
So some other ways were used in assessing R&D utility. Griliches (1980) and Tsai and Wang 
(2005) use the R&D output elasticity in the following way: fit=ait+γrit+εit, where f is the growth 
rates of TFP and r is the R&D capital. γ, in Tsai-Wang's paper, allows for a quadratic function of 
size S, measured in value added, γ=β0+β1S+β2S2. They find a better productivity for small and 
large firms with respect to medium size ones (the β2 was positive and significant).  
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This capital-based approach “ignores many of the distorsions associated with research that are 
formalized by the new growth theory, including monopoly pricing, intertemporal knowledge 
spillovers, congestion externalities and creative destruction” (Jones-Williams, 1997). 
For all these problems, then, some authors focused on some more concrete variables, like sales, 
profits and their relationship with R&D spending. There is plenty of literature in this empirical 
field too. Von Braun (1997), analyzing a dataset with the largest world's electronic companies, 
found almost no correlation between increased R&D spending and improvement in profitability. 
Kandybin and Kihn (2004), in a dataset with the thousand firms that, all around the world, spent 
most on R&D in 2004 (the Booz Allen Hamilton Global Innovator 1000), discovered no 
correlation between R&D investments and market shares, increase in sales or in profits. On the 
contrary, they found that the best performing firms, in terms of ratio of profits from new products 
divided by R&D, were the firms that invested less on R&D. The authors then analyzed the 
returns on incremental innovation investments, finding also here diminishing returns. They called 
the marginal returns on R&D the “innovation effectiveness curve”, that is decreasing with R&D 
and surprisingly stable within a company. This suggests that, even if projects within a portfolio 
change, R&D productivity is like a “fixed effect” of the firm, borrowing the expression from 
econometrics.  This finding is confirmed also in Wakelin (2001) , who assesses the importance of 
the innovation history of the firm and the sector in influencing the rate of return to R&D. 
Jaruzelski (2005), analyzing the same dataset, found no relationship too between R&D spending 
and the primary measures of economic or corporate success, like growth, profits or shareholder 
return. He found a negative relationship between size and R&D spending (while other authors, 
many of them quoted above, found a proportional relationship) and, in contrast with Kandybin 
and Kihn, that the low-investing firms had worse results than the others. He pointed out also that 
R&D spendings are very concentrated in the biggest firms: the top 2000 investing firms spent, in 
2004, $410 billion, just $26 billion (6.8%) more than the top 1000 considered in his dataset. 
Klette and Kortum (2001), finally, state that the ratio R&D/sales (R&D intensity) is independent 
from size, in contrast with Jaruzelski, and that its distribution is highly skewed, with many firms 
reporting zero R&D even in high-tech sectors. These issues will be investigated in this work too. 
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1.5 Relationship R&D-physical investments 
 
In analyzing the success indicators of the firms, R&D as explanatory variable will be coupled 
with physical investments, because of the deep links between them. They are like the two mirror 
images of the same concept: renouncing to profits today for the expectation of higher profits 
tomorrow. R&D is the intangible part of this, while physical investment is its tangible part. There 
is a literature about the complementarity of R&D with physical investment, which can be 
summed up in Bernstein and Nadiri (1984) and Chiao (2001). Bernstein and Nadiri found that 
R&D tends to be complementary with physical investment, while substitute for labour. Chiao, 
who also analyzed the relationship R&D-investment with a dynamic simultaneous approach, 
found the same relationship of complementarity. 
 
While assessing the impact of R&D on the success of a firm, I will follow this approach, 
considering in our analysis both R&D and investments. Taking as granted that R&D and 
investment are complements, still literature tried to investigate whether there is a causality 
between them and, if there is, its nature. There is a large literature about this topic, which 
includes two main issues of interest: first, wheter R&D Granger-causes physical investment or 
the other way round and, second, the relationship between the variance of R&D and the variance 
of investments. Granger causality (Granger, 1969) is a concept used in time-series analysis, for 
which a time series X is said to Granger-cause Y if it can be shown, or through a series of F-tests  
on lagged values of X (and with lagged values of Y also known) or through a simple t-test, that 
those X values provide statistically significant information about future values of Y.  The first 
author that addressed the relationship R&D-investment was Schumpeter (1939), who generated a 
theory of business cycles based partly on a causal link between exogenous successful inventions 
and subsequent capital investment. Schmookler (1966) developed the same basic idea in a 
framework where inventive activity stimulates physical investment, with the difference that here 
the innovative activity is endogenous. Later, Lach and Schankerman (1989) and Lach and Rob 
(1996) tested these hypotheses in an empirical analysis of science-based industries. They found 
that there is a one-way relationship between R&D and investment, where the first Granger-causes 
the second. The explanation they provide is in the model of industry evolution they built up, 
where “the dynamics are driven by a process of endogenous innovation followed by subsequent 
embodiments in physical capital” (Lach-Rob, 1996). They imagine R&D as a random innovation 
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process that, if successful, needs some physical capital investment to make it profitable. Because 
investments are caused by random innovations, the variance of investments is expected to be 
higher than the variance of R&D. R&D is performed depending on future expectations, which 
make it less volatile and more independent with respect to past realizations. One of the main 
consequences is that R&D can cause physical investment. Lach and Rob(1996), in the same 
article, and Klette (2001) found that Var(Inv)>Var(R&D). This is what I are interested to test in 
our work. 
 
On the other hand, these results in the literature are not clear. Tovainen and Stoneman (1998), in 
a research on 185 UK firms from 1984 to 1992, found that the variance of the log levels of R&D 
is twice as large as that of investment and, totally at odds with the previous literature, that 
physical investment Granger-causes R&D. They hypothesize that it is reasonable to expect that 
technological opportunities will stimulate investment, but that firm's own R&D is not a good 
indicator of such opportunities. Because of spillovers, technological opportunities may arise also 
from the R&D of other firms in the same industry, other industries, universities etc. Furthermore, 
“new offerings from the capital goods industries, learning, design and other such activities may 
all generate new technological opportunities that are not adequately proxied by the firms own 
R&D” (ibid.).  These findings, in the view of the authors, indicate that some of the stylized facts 
as stated by Lach and Schankerman are not as stylized as might have originally been thought and 
that more empirical work in the area of the dynamic relationship between R&D and investment is 
still required.  
 
Chiao (2001), after three years, sheds some other intriguing shadows on these issues. He starts, 
too, by analyzing the hypotheses of Lach-Schankerman and Lach-Rob. He found that, first, 
increasing the number of time periods and/or the number of firms with respect to their studies, 
their results do not hold anymore, and second that, employing a dynamic simultaneous approach, 
previous R&D affects current physical investment but previous investment affects current R&D 
too. In the literature, then, we can find all the types of relationships: R&D causes investments 
(Lach-Schankerman, 1989, Lach-Rob, 1996), investment causes R&D (Tovainen-Stoneman, 
1998) and a two-way positive relationship (Chiao, 2001). In this work I will address this issue, in 
order to shed more light on it and to decribe the behaviour of Norwegian medium and big firms. 
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 To sum up, my research questions can be summarized as: 
– What are the main determinants of R&D investments in Norway? I will use both the 
regressors most widely used in the literature (sales, profits and liquidity) as well as qualitative 
variables (sectorial dummies, time dummies, foreign dummy). 
– How is size related to R&D investments? The answer will let us know whether the 
appropriability argument is stronger, weaker or compensates the diminishing returns one. 
–  How does being foreign affect R&D expenditures in Norway? 
– How R&D investments are related to the success indicators of a firm? 
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2.   The Dataset 
  
The dataset I have analysed derives from various preceding administrative datasets, received 
from Statistics Norway with the permission from the Data Inspectorate in Norway and kept in BI 
– Norwegian School of Management and Frischsenter. They include financial and accounting 
firm-level information, such as profits, sales, work force, industrial classification and survey data 
on  R&D expenditures. They include also the NACE code, the Norwegian code to identify the 
firm sector. This code embodies the same information as the American SIC (Standard Industrial 
Classification). The initial datasets were the “Regnskap” (= ”accounting”, in Norwegian) 
datasets, one for each year from 1995 to 2005. They include all the data of the balance sheet and 
economic statement, so profits, sales revenues, labor costs, work force and so on. The Regnskap 
datasets were merged together, in order to have a complete dataset for all the years from 1995 to 
2005, and then merged with “Tidsseriebasefrisch” (=”Time series”). This is a dataset generated 
by Frischsenter on the basis of the information from Statistics Norway. It included more 
information about the firms, like the industrial classification and the R&D expenditures. Both 
Regnskap and Tidsseriebasefrisch are based on accounting data. I have merged these datasets and 
kept only the firms that were present in both of them. Fortunately the number of matched firms is 
very high, so the information loss was not a concern here. Just one firm had a different value for 
sales revenues in Regnskap and Tidsserie for some reporting error, so that observation was 
excluded. 
 
Then I merged the resulting dataset with the various “Eierskap” (= “Ownership”) datasets, one 
for each year since 2000 to 2005, which have information about the ownership of the firms active 
in Norway in this period. We can know from them wheter a firm is actually owned by 
Norwegians, by foreigners or whether there is a participation of both in its ownership. The useful 
point of unifying Eierskap datasets with our dataset is that we can analyse how foreign ownership 
affects R&D investment in Norway; the drawback is that we lose the data from years 1995 to 
1999. 
Fortunately, this is actually not a serious concern, as since 1995 to 2001 the data on R&D were 
sampled just once every two years: that means that in Regnskap-Tidsseriebasefrisch we have 
R&D data just for 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001,2002,2003,2004 and 2005. The data before 2001 
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would be missing if we use any lagged value of R&D, so it would be lost anyway in the analysis 
of the relation between R&D and physical investments and in assessing the impact of R&D.  
So every time that foreign ownership will be analysed, or everytime that a lagged value for R&D 
is included in a regression, we will have a sample of firms just from year 2000 to 2005. 
This will make us lose some observations, but there are some cases where introducing a lagged 
variable will be necessary. So analysing foreign ownership at the cost of losing the observations 
of years 1995, 1997 and 1999 is probably a good trade-off. 
Both the Regnskap-Tidsserie and the Eierskap datasets include firms of every size. As there are 
the biggest firms, there are also firm with just 1 employee. The problem is in the sampling 
procedure, as for R&D just firms with more than 100 employees were asked, by Statistics 
Norway (the Norwegian institute of statistics), for their R&D expenditures. Firms from 50 to 100 
were asked just in some years (without a clear rule), while firms with less than 50 were asked 
very few times, but especially if they reported a positive amount in the preceding year. That 
means that firms with less than 100 employees are a source of a potential selection bias – 
especially the smallest ones. Including them in the regression would lead to think that many small 
firms perform R&D, while this is due to the sampling procedure. Furthermore, it is well known 
that small firms normally perform much more informal R&D than big firms (Cohen, 1987,  
Schmookler, 1959) . It is common that they do not have a specific R&D department, laboratory 
or specialised personnel. Nevertheless, they research too. An error in reporting R&D, also, 
because of their small size, can be relatively worse than a reporting error for a big firm, as the 
relative amount of R&D/sales will change much more. For these problems I decided to analyse 
just firms with more than 100 employees. 
 
Also for them, anyway, we do not have complete information. Statistics Norway asked them to 
provide data on their R&D expenditures and the information is said to be mandatory, but no 
sanction is imposed if they do not answer. The “true” mandatory obbligations are the balance 
sheet and the income statement and R&D is not a part of them. Many firms then simply do not 
answer. The ones that answer are included in the “R&D statistikken” (= “R&D statistics”) and 
are actually the firms we can analyse. The initial number of observations, after merging the 
accounting data with the dataset about R&D expenditures, is 9685, due to 1937 firms. 
Because of different intersectorial sampling procedures, also some sectors were taken away.  
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The firms of the construction, the wholesale trade and the land transport sectors were asked for 
their R&D only if they had more than 250 employees. This could create another type of selection 
bias, because we would see only very big firms in these sectors, while for every other sector we 
have firms with more than just 100 employees. In order to avoid this, I decided to take them 
away. They were 596 observations. 
 
The resulting dataset has afterwards been “cleaned”. Hall and Mairese (1995) clean their data by 
removing outliers in both growth rates and levels (any level outside median +/- 3*interquartile 
range and growth of value added <-90% and >300%). They also remove any firms with less than 
three years of observations in the data. Also Los and Verspagen (2000) omit any firm with an 
“excessive” sales growth (+80%). I partly followed these approaches, but with a “rule of reason” 
depending on my dataset. I did not take away the firms with few years of observations, as many 
firms are present only few times. Removing them would greatly reduce the available information. 
Nevertheless I followed an approach similar to Hall-Mairese and Los-Verspagen. 
I took away the firms that had, even in just one year, a ratio R&D/sales greater than 1, as it is not 
a sustainable strategy in the long run.  The reasons for having such a high ratio cannot be that 
these firms are in the start-up period, as in the dataset there are just firms with more than 100 
employees, and looking at their start date, we see that no firm (among the ones with 
R&D/sales>1) is new-born. The reasons can be simply measurement error (misreporting in the 
official accounting or errors in creating the initial dataset) or the firm may have large revenues in 
foreign countries (declared in the foreign accounting, but not to the Norwegian one), while 
performing R&D in Norway. In any case, these observations would create problems to our 
analysis, so I took them away. They were 32 observations. 
 
Then I disregarded the firms that had no sales in the current year. These firms may be just a 
depandance of another firm with a particolar goal, for example a research center: in this case, 
considering them as a firm 'tout court' would seriously bias our results. They could also be firms 
that have just exited from the market but, for accounting reasons, are still present in our dataset 
(for example for the dismissal of the assets, etc). In both cases they would give problems to our 
work, so they have been taken away. They were 75 observations.   
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I also did not consider firms that had, in any year, a ratio profits/sales less than -1 or greater than 
1. The reasons for having a ratio outside the interval [-1, +1] can be an imminent bankruptcy     
(<-1), or a dismissal of assets before exiting the market (>1). In both cases, these are exceptional 
moments that cannot be considered as normality. As these firms could bias any inference, I took 
them away too. They were 139 observations. 
 
The non-matching data between the accounting and the R&D data were already taken away in the 
datasets merging phase, but some firm were present more than once a year. The reason can be 
that it recognised some errors in the data reporting, so it sent another declaration in order to 
correct them. In this case I kept just the last observation. Furthermore, some observations did not 
have the match in the 'eierskap' (ownership) dataset. This cleaning took away 678 observations. 
 
Finally, but most importantly, we can actually analyze the R&D investment only of the firms that 
answered to the survey which, for that, were registered in the 'fou_statistikken' (R&D statistics) 
database. This ruled out 3626 observations (the 44% of the total). 
The dataset that we can actually analyse, then, includes 4567 observations (1464 firms) out of the 
precedent 9679 (1934 firms). The observations with positive R&D are 2271, due to 797 firms. 
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I created other variables to make the analysis more complete. 
First, I created a sectorial dummy for each NACE sector, using the first two digits (in order to 
avoid both creating too specific and too general sectors), following an approach already used by 
Rogers (2006). The omitted dummy is the primary sector (agriculture, fishing and mining). 
Also I created time dummies, one for each year except 2005. So the coefficients of the sectorial 
dummies can be seen as deviations from the primary sector, while the coefficients of the time 
dummies as deviations from year 2005. The idea of time dummies is widespread as in 
microeconometrics as also in scientific papers dealing with R&D. Two authors that use this 
approach are Segarra-Blasco (2007) and again Rogers (2006). Wooldridge (2002) confirms that 
using time dummies is a good idea when dealing with datasets with a large number of individuals 
and few years. 
 
Using time and sectorial dummies implicitly assumes that the coefficients of the regressions will 
not change across sectors and years. While this can be a reasonable assumption for the years 
(excluding exceptional events, there no reason why the determinants of R&D expenditures should 
change from one year to another), the issue is not so straightforward for the sectors. In one sector 
past profits can have a certain impact on R&D expenditures and a different one in another one. 
Pooling firms of different sectors together, we assume that this does not happen. Actually a 
formal F-test of this hypothesis (that manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms could be 
pooled) was performed in Rogers (2006) and was rejected.  Nevertheless, two reasons make me 
decide to pool the firms anyway. First, running separate regressions for each sector would make 
burdensome the analysis of the results, would make the reader sink in many uninteresting details 
and would reduce the precision of the estimates. Also, just the presentation of the results would 
be much longer than what a final thesis should be. I am interested in the economy-wide effect of 
the variables, even if there are econometric drawbacks (Marcellino, 2006, and Wooldridge, 
2002). This is the price we have to pay to obtain semplicity. But this is a good deal, as our 
interest does not lie in the effect of the independent variables in each single sector. Second, the 
dummy approach will let us notice the difference from one sector to another at first sight. If we 
are interested in discovering which sectors normally devote most of their revenues to R&D, the 
answer will be clear in one regression. This would not be possible by running two or more 
separate regressions, one for each sector, as all the coefficients would change. 
 23
After creating time and sectorial dummies, I created many types of lagged variables and many 
growth variables. All of them will turn out to be useful in the following analysis.. 
All the price values in the dataset have been normalised to the price level in 1998. All the 
financial variables are then in real values, so we avoid to give more importance to the firms 
present in the dataset just in the last years.  
 
This dataset, as almost every dataset, has some limitations. It is not a balanced dataset, as many 
firms are observed just few times, while others are present since 1995 until 2005. Anyway, 
having removed the structural sources of potential bias (like the three differently sampled sectors 
and the small firms), the missing observations do not make the dataset affected by selection bias. 
The only loss is in the total available information. On the contrary, the elimination of small firms 
could be considered in itself a limitation. But the problems arising from including them would 
likely be greater than the problems from excluding them, not only because of informal R&D and 
the linked problems in measuring its true value, but because the small firms in the original 
datasets are affected by selection bias. The probability of being sampled in one year depended on 
having reported positive R&D in the previous year. These two facts would be a much greater 
problem than simple missing information. 
 
Another limitation is that financial data here are taken by accounting data. Accounting data can 
be different from economic data, they follow different rules and each national taxation system 
can give different incentives in misreporting the true economic values. Nevertheless, this is a 
hardly tackleable problem (Rogers, 2006). As we have only firms that operate in Norway, having 
just one taxation system will not make this problem worse. Having firms operating, say, both in 
Norway and Sweden would make the problem more serious. R&D data, anyway, are audited, so 
they are highly reliable. 
 
Unfortunately, on the contrary, data on R&D are  pooled altogether, without separating between 
basic and applied R&D. This would have been a very interesting topic, as much literature 
discusses the different incentives that large and small firms have in developing these two kinds of 
R&D (Scherer, 1965, Rosen, 1991, Jovanovic-Lach, 1999). 
Finally, as we just have accounting data, we do not know the number of released patents. 
Normally, in the literature, patents are seen as a measure of productivity (Scherer, Klette), even if 
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some authors follow other ways (Rogers: value added/R&D; Cohen-Klette: Innovation/R&D). 
We can think to patents as a “throughput” between the R&D-input and the sales (or profits, or 
sales growth, etc)-output. As we do not have this, our analysis will have to “jump” from the input 
to the output directly. This will hide the underlying dynamics of R&D process, but it is an 
approach widely used also in the most recent literature (Kandybin, 2004, Von Braun, 1996, 
Mansfield, 1981, Jaruzelski, 2005).  
 
So, even if the dataset has some limitations, after the above mentioned corrections it does not 
have any known selection bias and it is very rich. Many datasets in other researches have much 
less observations and are much less broad in sectors, variables and time, so it is nevertheless a 
quite good dataset to work on. 
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2.1   Econometric models 
 
In this work I will analyse the data using various microeconometric techniques, in order to deal 
with panel data. This is the reason why I will not use simple OLS regressions. 
I will use the following techniques. 
 
GLS: Generalized Least Squares is a generalisation of OLS that allows us to deal with panel data, 
by relaxing some of the assumptions of OLS. In particular, it relaxes the assumptions of 
homoscedasticity and uncorrelation between error terms. The advantage of GLS compared to 
OLS is that we can allow for a positive correlation between error terms within the same firm over 
time. The reason is that if a firm has a dependent variable (say R&D investment) which is in 2000 
higher than its expected value, conditional on the explanatory variables (like sales, past profits, 
sectorial dummies etc), we expect that in 2001 the dependent variable will be higher too. 
Probably we have unobserved heterogeneity that is not explained by the independent variables: it 
can be due to the ability of the managers, the know-how and so on. The practical change in the 
estimators is in the variance-covariance matrix. While in OLS it was diagonal and with all the 
elements equal to each other, here we allow for a positive intra-firm correlation (keeping the 
correlation between errors of different firms equal to 0) and for heteroscedasticity. These features 
will let us deal with panel datasets that include both very large and small firms 
(heteroscedasticity) and to the within-firm residual correlation, the time-series dimension (Fox, 
2002).  Both features will show up to be important. The estimators are β^GLS=(X'Σ-1X)-1(X'Σ-1y) 
and their variance is Var(β^GLS)=(X'Σ-1X)-1.  Following the approach of Holt and Scott (1981), we 
can define Cov(u)=σ2B, where u is the error term and B is a block diagonal matrix with 
submatrices Bj of order mj*mj for each cluster (firm). J is the number of the clusters (firms). Each 
Bj has, as elements, 1 in the diagonal and ρ in the other positions, where ρ is the correlation of the 
residuals within the same firm over time. β^GLS is consistent and unbiased, like OLS, but is more 
efficient. More importantly, the inference and hypothesis testing is now valid, while with OLS it 
is not. Unfortunately we do not know “a priori” Σ, but we can to estimate it. This leads to the so-
called “Feasible Generalised Least Squares” (FGLS), that gives biased estimators (in finite 
samples). The reason is that to build the estimator Σ^ we must use the observations on Y and X, 
so Σ^ and the error terms are correlated by definition. Anyway FGLS gives consistent estimators.  
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Because there is not indipendence between within-firm residuals, OLS estimators' standard errors 
will be downward biased, so the inference for t or F tests will be invalid (Kish, Frankel, 1974). 
The true probability intervals are wider. We would find the estimators more significant than what 
they really are and hypothesis testing would be misleading. Considering the size of the dataset 
and that FGLS keeps into account the intra-firm correlation of the residuals, I find FGLS better 
than simple OLS. 
 
Probit: this model aims at describing situations where the dependent variable is binary, i.e. 
y={0,1}. It avoids the problems that arise with a simple OLS estimation. When y* is binary, OLS 
could estimate a value for y greater than 1 or less than 0, which is not coeherent, as the 
E[y|x]=P(y=1|x)*1+P(y=0|x)*0, that is E[y|x]=P(y=1|x). As the expected value of y is a 
probability, it must be constrained between 0 and 1, but the predicted value can be outside this 
interval. Furthermore OLS implies constant partial effects. A second problem is 
heteroscedasticity. Let us assume that y=xβ+ε; as y={0,1}, ε=1-xβ with probability P=xβ, and ε=-
xβ with probability 1-P=1-xβ. 
E[ε2]=(1-xβ)2P+(-xβ)2(1-P)=(1-xβ)xβ=P(1-P)=E[y](1-E[y]).  
That means that Linear Probability Models has also a problem of heteroscedasticity. We could 
use a GLS estimator in order to keep into account it, but still the predicted probability could be 
outside the interval [0,1]. So it is better to use another specification, the Probit. 
Probit specification assumes that there is an underlying continuous unobserved variable, 
y*=xβ+u, and that y=1 if y*>0 or y=0 if y*<0.  
So P(y=1)=P(u>-xB)=1-P(u<-xB)=1-G(-xB)=G(xB). Probit assumes that G is the Normal 
Cumulative Distribution. Logit, a close relative of Probit, assumes the logistic distribution of the 
error term. I will perform Probit model when dealing with the probability of investing in R&D. 
 
Tobit (type I): this model (Tobin, 1958) deals with censored observations. It allows to have 
consistent estimates when  a censoring limit would make OLS inconsistent. It is a mixture of 
probit and truncated regression (Tobin,1958; Smith and Brame, 2003) for partly continuous 
variables but with positive probability mass at one or more points (Wooldridge, 2002). 
We assume an underlying model y*=xβ+u. The observed variable is y. y=y* if y*>0, y=0 
otherwise. As it is a maximum likelihood estimation, it requires the normality of the error terms 
and homoscedasticity (Smith and Brame, 2003; Reynolds and Shonkwiler, 1991). 
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So E[y|y>0]=xβ+E[u|u>-xβ]=xβ+σ[φ(xβ/σ)/Φ(xβ/σ)] and E[y]=Φ(xβ/σ)xβ+σφ(xβ/σ). 
It also needs that the partial effects of each variable on the probability of observing y>0 is the 
same as the impact on the amount of y (Wooldridge, 2002; Lin and Schmidt, 1984; Heckman, 
1979; Smith and Brame, 2003). The need for normality and homoscedasticity is stricter than in 
OLS-GLS, as in Tobit model not only the efficiency but also the consistency is affected. Also the 
need for constant relative partial effect is something undesirable. These are limitations on which I 
will come back later.  
 
Heckman two-stage estimation: Heckman's estimation (Heckman, 1979) is a two-steps procedure: 
The first step is the selection equation: z*=γw+u, with u~N(0,1) and z* unobserved, where z=1 if 
z*>0 and z=0 if z*<0. So it is a probit regression. If z=1, then we observe the value of y. In this 
case we have the second step: y=βx+e, with e~N(0,σ2). From the first step we can estimate the 
vector of inverse Mills ratio (estimated expected errors), then we perform OLS on the second step 
by regressing y on the explanatory variables and the vector of inverse Mills ratio (i.e. performing 
a truncated regression). This will remove the part of the error term correlated with the 
explanatory variables and will avoid the sample selection bias. The set of the explanatory 
variables of the second equation should be a subset of the explanatory variables of the selection 
equation. They could also be the same, but this would bring problems of multicollinearity 
(Wooldridge, 2002), as the inverse Mills ratio could be well estimated with a linear function of 
the vector of independent variables. This procedure will let us estimate the coefficients of the 
truncated regression E[y]. OLS and GLS, on the other hand, will let us see E[y|y>0], regressing 
just the positive y on the explanatory variables. If we think that in the “true” model y can have 
both positive and negative values, Heckman procedure is the right one. If we are just interested in 
the effect on y given that it is positive, we can simply run OLS-GLS on the positive values. I will 
come to that later. 
 
Fixed and Random effects: these two methods are designed especifically for panel data. 
Both have a structure like yit=xitB+ai+uit, where ai is specifical for each firm. In FE method ai's 
are like dummy variables and are fixed parameters. In RE the estimation is done via generalized 
least squares (GLS) and ai's are treated like random variables. They are assumed to have a normal 
distribution and to be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables in order to have consistent 
estimates. Even if there is heteroscedasticity, its estimates are consistent (Wooldridge, 2002). 
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In FE we use each firm as a control for itself and it is equivalent to performing OLS on the 
deviations from the mean for each firm (Allison, 2005). FE allows to see the effects only of the 
variables that change over time. This is a high cost: all the impact of the sectorial and nationality 
dummies is canceled out (unless there is a change in nationality or sector in time). Furthermore, 
FE makes the problem of measurement errors worse, as it consists in OLS on the deviations from 
the mean. This implies that we include the measurement error two times in the regression, which 
this will make the attenuation bias larger (Rogers, 2006, Mairese-Siu, 1982). Measurement errors 
are an important problem in self-reported accounting data. For these two reasons I will not use it 
widely while studying the determinants of R&D. I will rather use RE and FGLS, which considers 
both the information within firm as well as between firms, permitting to estimate also the 
variables that do not change over time (like the “foreign” and the sectorial dummies). I will use 
FE while studying the effects of R&D on the success indicators and the relationship R&D-
physical investment. In this case FE are more suited than RE for they take away all the fixed 
characteristics that affect the success of a firm, leaving just the variables that we include. 
FE use only the “within” information. So they discard the between-person variation, yielding 
considerably higher standard errors than those produced by methods that use both kinds of 
information. This has, anyway, a good consequence: the between-person variation is likely to be 
contaminated by unmeasured personal characteristics that are correlated with the explanatory 
variables. By focusing on just the within-person variation we increase the sampling variability, 
but we likely get less biased estimates. 
 
Breusch-Pagan test: this is a test for heteroscedasticity. It is necessary to test the null hypothesis 
of homoscedasticity because heteroscedasticity, in some models (like Tobit), will not affect just 
the efficiency but also the consistency of the estimators. It is a “constructive” test, in the sense 
that it specifies the form of the alternative hypothesis of heteroscedasticity as a multiplicative 
function of the residuals with the explanatory variables (Breusch and Pagan, 1979). Zaman 
(1995) showed that it is valid just for linear functions of residuals with the explanatory variables. 
It consists, in the version of White (Marcellino, 2006), in running an auxiliary regression of ui2 on 
the same variables as in the original regression and then obtaining an F statistic (or t-statistic, if 
there is just one independent variable). Another way is to obtain the LM statistic, LM=nR2, which 
for large n under the null hypothesis is distributed as χ2(n). If the χ2 value (or the F-test) exceeds 
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the critical value at the chosen level of significance, we reject the null hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity. 
 
Shapiro-Wilk test: this is a test for normality. This test is defined as  
W=(∑ni=1wiX'i)2/∑ni=1(Xi-Xmean)2, where w'=MV-1(M'V-1)(V-1M)-1/2. M denotes the expected 
values of standard normal order statistics for a sample of size n and V is the corresponding 
covariance matrix. Null hypothesis of normality is rejected for low values of W. 
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3   Determinants of R&D 
 
The analysis of the determinants of R&D expenditures will be lead through with a focus both on 
total R&D and on the ratio R&D/sales. Half of the present literature, basically, follows the first 
approach, half the second (Jaruzelski, 2005, Scherer 1965, Klepper, 1996). There are advantages 
in both. The first gives us a straightforward idea of “who is investing how much”, while the 
second, recognizing that R&D is deeply connected with the size, offers some econometric 
advantages, like a reduction of heteroscedasticity and a more normal distribution of the residuals. 
This would let us run, in principle, consistent Probit or Tobit models and avoid the dimension 
bias. It also enables comparisons about the relative importance of innovation in different sectors 
without worrying about the average size of their firms (Jaruzelski et al., 2005). 
  
In this chapter we have many types of regressions, in order to analyse the probability of investing 
in R&D, the total amount and the ratio R&D/sales invested. We also have some descriptive 
statistics to look more closely at the real data. The variables that I will included in these 
regressions will be explained singularly. 
 
Profits: more past profits could make the firm less risk-averse with respect to a “random 
innovation process” like R&D (Lach, 1996, Klette, 2001), making them more willing to invest 
more. In this case its coefficient would be positive. On the other hand, if a firm does not change 
its risk-aversion after a successful innovation, or if it believes that it is investing optimally, its 
coefficient should be around zero. We expect these results both for the probability of investing as 
for the absolute and relative amount invested. 
 
Liquidity: a higher present liquidity could make it easier to face new investments in the future, if 
capital markets are imperfect. This makes it likely that a firm with a high liquidity will invest a 
higher amount in R&D. At the same time it may increase the probability that a firm invests. 
In these cases we expect the coefficient to be positive. In the R&D regression we will include the 
total liquidity amount. 
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Sales: there is a huge literature about the relationship of this variable with R&D. A large part of 
the literature uses the workforce to assess firm size, while another large part uses sales. I will use 
sales for many advantages that it has with respect to employment. Following Scherer (1965), 
sales are responsive to short run shocks and they are the principal scale variable considered in 
company R&D budget decisions. In the R&D regression we simply expect a positive and 
significant relationship, but the interesting part will be in the R&D/sales regression. A coefficient 
around zero would imply an almost linear relationship between R&D and sales, while a negative 
coefficient would imply that R&D grows less than proportionally with sales. Understanding this 
relationship can have important implications in assessing, indirectly, the productivity of R&D. 
We can think to the “effectiveness curve” of Kandybin-Kihn (2004), for example. 
Sales value is also expected to have a positive effect on the probability of investing: descriptive 
statistics, in the literature as well as in our dataset, shows an increasing percentage in the ratio 
investing firms/total firms as size grows up. 
 
All these variables will be used in their lagged version, which permits to avoid the simultaneity 
problem (Rogers, 2006). Using their current value would not permit to distinguish between the 
effect that R&D has on them and the opposite way round. Using lagged values, in order to avoid 
this problem, is an approach also used by Lach and Rob (1996), while assessing the causality 
between R&D and investments. A significant relationship does not necessarily mean causality, 
but at least we can remove this first concern. In addition, profits and liquidity show another 
problem, if entered in the regression with their current values. An increase in current R&D 
would, by definition, lower both liquidity and profits, because it absorbs money without giving 
immediate results. The estimates of profits and liquidity coefficients would then be biased. 
 
Foreign: this dummy is 1 if the firm is foreign, 0 if it is Norwegian. If foreign firms are structured 
as the Norwegian ones, we would expect this dummy to have a not significant effect both on the 
probability of investing and on the invested amount. But if foreign firms are, at least in part, just 
“selling dependances” of the mother firm, or if there are significant sunk costs in beginning 
R&D, we expect a negative coefficient both on the total amount as on the probability of 
investing.  Empirically some multinational firms centralize R&D in their home country, while 
others invest in R&D even abroad (Narula-Zanfei, 2003). The analysis of this coefficient can 
suggest which type of these firms is the majority in Norway. 
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Sectorial dummies: these dummies show the effect of each industrial sector on the expected 
invested amount in R&D, R&D/sales and the probability of investing. We can be pretty sure that 
not all the sectors have similar optimal R&D expenditures. These dummies will show which 
sectors are more research-intensive. An analysis with dummy variables implies that we force the 
coefficients of the other explanatory variables to remain constant across different sectors. This 
can be a simplistic assumption, but the easiness and the linearity of interpreting just one 
regression instead of fourtynine (as the number of sectors are) make the advantages of this 
approach overwhelm its drawbacks. Furthermore many sectors have too few observations 
(firms*time) to allow for a meaningful analysis. A good compromise is to compare the results of 
the regression with all the sectors together with other two regressions, one for the high-investing 
sector and one for the rest. The high-investing sector will be defined later, after knowing the 
sectorial coefficients. These dummies represent the sectorial effect with respect to the primary 
sector, defined as agricolture, fishing and mining. In the R&D regressions the coefficient of these 
dummies will not be very meaningful, as it will depend on the average size of the firms in that 
sector. In this regression, the only interesting thing is to see which sectors have a significant 
impact. The coefficients will become meaningful in the R&D/sales regression, as in this case they 
will be the average difference in this ratio compared to the primary sector. 
 
Time dummies: these dummies capture the eventual changes in time of the dependent variable. 
They assume, in the same way as the sectorial dummies, that the coefficients of the other 
variables remain the same across different years. In this case this is not a problem, as all the 
monetary values, like profits, sales and R&D, have been deflated with the Norwegian CPI, taken 
from Statistics Norway (the Norwegian institute of statistics). The year of reference for the 
deflation was arbitrarily taken as 1998. I preferred to deflate them using CPI rather than the 
production price index because the most important financial values, like profits and sales, are 
logically more related to the final prices rather than to input prices. An overall price index, rather 
to a production price index, to deflate these variables was used also in Mairesse and Siu (1982). 
These dummies show the expected difference of the dependent variable with respect to year 
2005. 
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3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Here the average values and other descriptive statistics for R&D expenses, during each year, will 
be computed. In this part I limited my analysis to the firms which invest in R&D. 
The two components explaining the variations in total R&D are the average investment for each 
firm and the total number of firms investing in R&D. The average investment will be the 'mean', 
while the number of firms involved in R&D is 'N'. The amounts are expressed in 1000 NOK. 
The investments have already been deflated, using the CPI, in order to allow for a comparison of 
the real investments in the different years. 
 
 N 233 N          284 
1995: Mean 28751.647 (5152.87) 2002: Mean   25006.2043 (4267.03)
 Total 6699133.76 Total   7101762.03 
 
 N 293 N 324      
1997: Mean 29466.6939 (4294.48) 2003: Mean 17851.871 (3918.44)            
 Total 8633741.31 Total 5784006.21   
 
 N 267 N  261                                
1999: Mean 27788.2119 (4789.83) 2004: Mean 22307.883 (3571.93)
 Total 7419452.59 Total 5822357.46 
 
 N 294 N  315                                
2001: Mean 25281.6808 (1726) 2004: Mean 18510.50 (3450.04)
 Total 7432814.17 Total 5830807.99 
 
 
 N 2271 (average 283 per year)
Total: Mean 24096.9069 (3989.36)
 Total 54724075.5 (6840509 per year) 
 
In year 1995 the firms with more than 100 employees which declared some positive investment 
in R&D were 233, with an average expense of 28,751,647 NOK during the year. The total 
investments in R&D from these firms was then 6,699,133 NOK 
With respect to 1995, in 1997 there is a much larger number of big firms (>100 employees) 
which invest in R&D (233 in 1995, 293 in 1997) when also the average value of the investments 
had a slight increase. The total investments are then 8,633,741,310 NOK, an increase of 28.87% 
with respect to 1995, when they were 6,699,133,760 NOK. In year 1999 we had a slight 
reduction in the number of investing firms, 267 from 293, and still a very similar amount in the 
declared R&D. In year 2001 we have a similar total amount invested in R&D, but due to 
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contrasting effects: on one hand we have a larger number of investing firms (294 instead of 267), 
on the other hand we see a smaller average expenditure (25.281.680 rather than 27.788.212 
NOK). We can see similar results also for year 2002, while in year 2003 we have a growth in the 
number of investing firms, but a diminish in the average amount. The changes from year 2003 to 
year 2004 have an opposite pattern with respect to the changes from 2002 to 2003. Here again we 
see less investing firms, but a higher average amount. In 2005 again we have the opposite shift: 
more firms but less expenditure. 
 
It seems then that there is some kind of negative correlation between the number of investing 
firms and the invested amount. In the following graphs the missing years were fitted as means 
between the preceding and the following year. 
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All these values are in 1000 NOK. For the nominal total value we see no particular trend, while 
we see a negative correlation between N and the real mean investment in R&D. An analytical 
computation gives a value of Corr(N,MeanR&D)=-0.67. The weird pattern of real R&D in time 
is basically due to the presence/absence of Statoil, the Norwegian state company monopolist of 
oil, that is not present in years 2003 and 2005. These are indeed the years when R&D drop. 
 
The real mean R&D seems clearly decreasing, while also the total real R&D shows a similar 
pattern, even if less strong. It will be interesting to see, then, whether this drop in real R&D is due 
just to the absence of Statoil in 2003 and 2005 or to some time-specific change. In that case, in a 
regression with R&D as the dependent variable, we expect the coefficients of the last dummies to 
be smaller than the coefficients of the first ones. If the drop is due to other factors, like the 
absence of Statoil or a drop in sales, the coefficients of the time dummies should not differ by 
much.  In order to understand it, it is necessary to see the pattern of R&D/sales and sales in time 
too. 
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The pattern of real sales is, as before, due to the presence/absence of Statoil. Fortunately this does 
not have any impact on R&D/sales value, as this ratio is almost the same both with and without 
Statoil in the dataset. This is a good thing, as results will not be ‘biased’ by the presence or 
absence of this firm. I decided to keep the present observations of Statoil anyway, as in two years 
it is the biggest investor in R&D and its ratio R&D/sales is similar to the rest of the firms. 
Real sales revenues do not show any particular trend and, furthermore, if we take away Statoil 
from all the dataset we see a positive trend.  
The ratio R&D/sales shows a dramatic drop in 2003, which lasted also for years 2004 and 2005, 
with respect to the previous years. An identical pattern is found if we take away Statoil too. 
All these observations suggest us that the change in total real investment is due to other factors 
than a reduction in sales (that actually did not happen). That means that we can expect the 
coefficients of the last time dummies to be smaller than the first dummies' ones.  
Also the ratio of investing firms on the total number of firms (with more than 100 employees, as 
usual) can be of some interest. This will enter the analysis on the probability of investing. 
Ratio of investing/total firms (>100 employees) in 1995: 233/638=37.3% 
Ratio of investing/total firms (>100 employees) in 1997: 293/565=52.2% 
Ratio of investing/total firms (>100 employees) in 1999: 267/610=44.75% 
Ratio of investing/total firms (>100 employees) in 2001: 294/606=49.5% 
Ratio of investing/total firms (>100 employees) in 2002: 298/599=49.74 
Ratio of investing/total firms (>100 employees) in 2003: 328/560=58.57% 
Ratio of investing/total firms (>100 employees) in 2004: 268/457=58.64% 
Ratio of investing/total firms (>100 employees) in 2005: 328/581=56.45% 
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The trend of this ratio is quite similar to the trend of investing firms, which is upward sloping 
too. Real sales do not show this pattern, so we expect, in a regression with the probability of 
investing as dependent variable, that the coefficients of the time dummies of the last years are 
higher than the first ones. This is opposite to what we expect for the regression of R&D.  
Another issue worth of investigating is the origin of R&D. Total real sales value (at prices of 
1998) are 55,068,435,200 NOK. The highest percentile of firms*time in sales invested 
7,237,993,000 NOK in R&D, which is 13% of the total amount. The highest 5 percentiles 
invested 14,443,173,900 NOK (26%) and the highest 10 percentiles invested 24,080,357,000 
NOK, the 44%. It is, then, evident that the biggest firms are the core leaders of R&D 
investments. In the following graph we have in the x-axis each firm*time, from the less investing 
in R&D (provided that R&D>0) in the left until the most investing in the right. This figure 
shows how much R&D is concentrated among few firms, that are the biggest ones in sales value.  
In the second graph we see that sales value are even more concentrated, with few very large 
firms. We can analyze, then, wheter the investment in R&D, relative to sales, is constant, 
increasing or decreasing with sales. These issues will be analyzed in the paragraph 3.1. 
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3.2 R&D regressions 
 
In this section we will introduce the regressions for the determinants of R&D. R&D will be the 
left-hand side variable and the right-hand side variables are the ones thought, in the literature, to 
have an explanatory power on R&D investments.  
 
So the general model is yi,t= c+α*πi,t-1+β*Si,t-1+γ*Li,t-1+φ*fi,t+σk*mk,i,t+τt*Tt+εi,t, where yi,t is the 
R&D expenditures of firm i in year t, πi,t-1 is the profit of firm i in year t-1,  Si,t-1 is the sales 
revenues of firm i in year t-1, Li,t-1 is the liquidity level  of firm i in year t-1, fi,t is the foreign 
dummy, with value 1 if the firm i is owned by foreign agents in year t, mk,i,t are the sectorial 
dummy variables, with value 1 if the firm i is in sector j=k in year t, Tt are the time dummies, 
with value 1 if the observation is in year t and εi,t the error term.  
I used the notation fi,t and mk,i,t because there are some firms that changed ownership and sector 
in the period 1995-2005. I used the lagged values of profits and sales in order to avoid the 
simultaneity problem. Here I just considered the positive values of R&D. A discussion on 
whether it is possible to have a model including both the positive and the zero values will be 
done after the probit regression. 
 
Here we will use a GLS procedure (a ‘clustered’ regression) in order to deal with the panel 
dimension of the dataset. That means that we adjust the standard error of the coefficients keeping 
into account that the observations within each firm are not independent, allowing for 
autocorrelation in the error term εi,t.  
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Linear regression (GLS)                Number of obs =    1507 (525 firms) 
R-squared     =  0.3208                   Root MSE      =   58643 
R&D          Coeff.   Std. Error                  t                         P>|t| 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
profitdlag1  .0141732 .025007         0.57 0.571
salesdlag1  .0056388 .001826         3.09 0.002
moneydlag1  .0115173 .0056465       2.04 0.042
foreign1 6632.756 10089.22       0.66 0.511
chemical  43881.65 24631.37        1.78 0.075
tobaccoind -42453.82 11832 -3.59 0.000
machineind  29379.96 16840.27 1.74 0.082
office_com~r  27466.04 7978.09 3.44 0.001
electric_a~s  16404.42 4239.681 3.87 0.000
radio_comm 114789.9 50322.61 2.28 0.023
medical_prd 30300.67 5878.631 5.15 0.000
motor_veh 9845.326 3590.477 2.74 0.006
detail_sale  -15029.85 3871.983 -3.88 0.000
transport_~s  -6627.208 2919.191 -2.27 0.024
 post_telecom  24300.19 20862.11 1.16 0.245
data_proce~g  47058.99 13755.58 3.42 0.001
d1997  6830.605 6371.104 1.07 0.284
d1999  5452.533 6313.734 0.86 0.388
d2001  355.8582 4525.15 0.08 0.937
d2002  -2681.381 3363.537 -0.80 0.426
d2003  -987.8173 3423.503 -0.29 0.773
d2004  -1484.974 2906.019 -0.51 0.610
_cons  -777.5508 4540.285 -0.17 0.864
-----------------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Before commenting the results, it is worth noting that many non-significant sectorial variables 
have been dropped from this summary (but were kept while computing the coefficients). Few 
non-significant have been kept if their coefficient was large.  
In order to test, first of all, whether these variables can give problems of multicollinearity, 
following Allison’s (1999) suggestions, we test the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF), a method of 
detecting the severity of multicollinearity. The VIF is an index that measures how much the 
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variance of a coefficient is increased because of collinearity with the other explanatory variables. 
Considering the following regression equation with k independent variables 
Y = β0 + β1 X1 + β2 X 2 + ... + βk Xk + ε,  VIF can be calculated in three steps. First, we can 
calculate k different VIFs, one for each Xi, by first running an ordinary least square regression 
with each Xi as dependent variable on the other Xj, j=1,2,…, j≠i. As a second step, we can 
calculate the VIF factor for each βi with the formula VIF(βi)=(1/(1-R2), where R2 is the R2 of the 
regression of the first step. The square root of the variance inflation factor tells us how much 
larger the standard error is, compared with what it would be if that variable were uncorrelated 
with the other independent variables in the equation. As a common rule of thumb, there is a 
serious evidence of multicollinearity if any of the VIF elements is bigger than 10 and the mean of 
all the VIFs is considerably greater than 1. We see that there is not a problem of multicollinearity 
here.  
 
Variable  VIF 
Profitdlag1  6.14 
Salesdlag1  5.25 
Moneydlag1  3.22 
Time dummies  1.58‐1.94 
Sectorial dummies 
 
Mean VIF 
1.01‐1.54 
 
1.57 
 
There is some collinearity between profits and sales, but it is not so high to create too big 
problems. 
 
Corr (πt, πt‐1)  πt  πt‐1 
         πt  1   
        πt‐1  0.8194  1 
 
As multicollinearity is not such a problem here, we do not need to modify this model. From the 
regression results, using a GLS procedure that allows the error term of each firm to be 
autocorrelated in time, we see that past profits do not have a significant impact on current R&D 
expenditures. This may suggest that past profits do not upgrade the expected returns from R&D. 
This is consistent with the findings of Wakelin (2001) and Kandybin’Kihn (2004) of stable 
returns from R&D within each firm. 
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Both size and liquidity (which is current assets – short term debt), on the contrary, had a 
significant impact on R&D. The fact that size had a significant impact was quite clear, but also 
liquidity shows a significant impact, with an even larger coefficient than sales. That may suggest 
that firms, if they invest (this is a regression only on the positive values of R&D), could be cash 
constrained and could invest not as much as they would find it optimal.  
 
The foreign dummy does not seem to have a significant impact on R&D, if firms invest. 
Many sectorial dummies were significant, which implies that, ceteris paribus, a firm in these 
sectors invest in R&D a significantly different amount from the firms in the primary sector. As 
pointed out before, we are interested just in the significancy of the sectorial coefficients here, not 
on the coefficients, as they depend on the average size of the firms. The most investing sectors 
were the chemical, the office computers, the electric, the radio and medical ones.  The ones that 
invested less were the tobacco industry, the detail sale and the transport sectors. 
 
The time dummies are never significantly different from zero, but we can see a decreasing trend, 
which fits the decreasing trend seen in the descriptive statistics. This trend was not due to a 
decrease in sales, as we saw from the tables in paragraph 3.1, but, as we can see also from the 
results of this regression (the decreasing coefficients of the time dummies), to time-specific 
factors. All these results, in order to be confirmed or contradicted, will be compared to the results 
from a Random Effects regression. 
 
The difference from the following regression with respect to the preceding one is that now the 
model becomes: yi,t= c+α*πi,t-1+β*Si,t-1+γ*Li,t-1+φ*fi,t+σk*mk,i,t+τt*Tt +ai+εi,t, where ai is the 
unobserved effect (from the terminology of Wooldridge, 2002). Each ai’s is treated as a random 
variable with a Normal distribution and is assumed to be uncorrelated with the other explanatory 
variables. This assumption can be not straightforward, that is the reason why I will not consider 
the random effects model as a perfect model. In order to infer the statistical properties of the 
determinants of R&D it is probably better to compare the GLS to the Random Effects regression, 
keeping in mind the strengths and the weaknesses of both. 
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Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =      1507 (525 firms) 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0107             between = 0.3878         overall = 0.3009                                                                                    
R&D      Coeff.     Std. Error                   z                        P>|z| 
--------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
profitdlag1  .0141732 .025007 0.57 0.571
salesdlag1  .0056388 .001826 3.09 0.002
moneydlag1  .0115173 .0056465  2.04 0.042
foreign1 6632.756 10089.22  0.66 0.511
tobaccoind  -42453.82 11832 -3.59  0.000
chemical  43881.65 24631.37 1.78 0.075
machineind  29379.96 16840.27 1.74 0.082
office_com~r  27466.04 7978.09 3.44 0.001
electric_a~s  16404.42 4239.681 3.87 0.000
radio_comm 114789.9 50322.61 2.28 0.023
medical_prd 30300.67 5878.631 5.15 0.000
motor_veh 9845.326 3590.477 2.74 0.006
detail_sale  -15029.85 3871.983 -3.88 0.000
transport_~s  -6627.208 2919.191 -2.27 0.024
 post_telecom  24300.19 20862.11 1.16 0.245
data_proce~g  47058.99 13755.58 3.42 0.001
d1997    6830.605 6371.104 1.07 0.284
d1999  5452.533 6313.734 0.86 0.388
d2001  355.8582 4525.15 0.08 0.937
d2002  -2681.381 3363.537 -0.80 0.426
d2003  -987.8173 3423.503 -0.29 0.773
d2004  -1484.974 2906.019 -0.51 0.610
_cons  -777.5508 4540.285 -0.17 0.864
 
Reassuringly, we find very similar results, which make us think that the results found before are 
quite robust to the different possible econometric specifications. Sales and liquidity are 
significant in both regressions, which gives support to the cash constraints hypothesis. 
Being owned by a foreign operator does not significantly change R&D investment, for positive 
R&D (afterwards I will list the descriptive statistics) and it is a coherent finding with the profit 
maximization axiom: if there is an optimal R&D investment policy, why a foreign operator 
should invest less? Following the explanation of Narula and Zanfei (2003), that means that the 
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firms that invest in R&D abroad behave like Norwegian firms. Later we will see whether there 
are more R&D-centralizer or decentralizer firms. 
 
Time dummies are not significant, but the important point is that, also here, they actually show a 
slight decreasing trend, as we expected while analyzing the pattern of R&D and sales in time. 
In particular, the dummies of 2003 and 2004 are much lower than the initial dummies (1997 and 
1999). This regression confirms our analysis that there were some time-specific factors that 
changed the R&D amount others than a change in sales. 
 
Many of the sectorial dummy coefficients are non-significant; the highest ones are the ones of 
chemical industry, the radio communication, the data processing industry, the electric apparatus 
and the medical industry, as it was in the GLS regression. The only sectors where R&D 
investments seem below the primary one are the tobacco industry, transports (even if not 
significantly), detail sale and restoration. These results confirm what we could expect: in sectors 
where the innovation is very important to survive and there is a high rate of turnover, R&D 
investments are needed to survive and be present in the market. The chemical, radio 
communication and data processing are all industries which fit in this description. 
The industries where R&D is below the average (unconditional on sectorial dummies) are 
industries where it is not so important to find new technologies: the firms in the sector of sale 
retailing or the sea transport do not need very innovative findings in order to remain in the 
market, the technologies they use are actually quite old. These results then confirm what theory 
predicts.  
 
We find very similar results also if, instead of using a dummy variable for the foreign control, we 
use a variable which represents the foreign share in the ownership. This variable is 1 if the firm is 
completely controlled by foreign agents, 0 if totally Norwegian and a fraction between 0 and 1 if 
Norwegian and foreign agents coexist in the ownership. This variable behaves in the same way as 
the 'foreign' dummy. It is not statistically different from it neither from zero. If we consider only 
the firms that are partially Norwegian and partially foreign, we have just 55 observations, of 
whom 33 have missing values, so the regression would be done just on 22 firms*time. Obviously 
we cannot infer statistical properties from such a small sample. 
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We can face the above regression also with the fixed effects method. It is the “strongest” way of 
dealing with panel data, as it takes away all the time-invariant variables. It will let us see only the 
behaviour of the firms that changed sector or ownership in time. 
That's why many dummies will be dropped, but this procedure can anyway give us important 
insights for the foreign dummy. The model is, as in the Random Effects regression,                  
yi,t= c+α*πi,t-1+β*Si,t-1+γ*Li,t-1+φ*fi,t+σk*mk,i,t+τt*Tt +ai+εi,t, where the ai’s are treated as fixed 
effects for each firm. We can see them as dummy variables. Fixed Effects regression will 
consider only the ‘within information’, as it takes away all the firm-specific factors. 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1507 (525 firms) 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0331       between = 0.0029       overall = 0.0120                                         
R&D   Coeff.   Std. Error       z           P>|z| 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  profitdlag1 .002608   .0051371       0.51     0.612    
    salesdlag1 -.0007114 .001383      -0.51   0.607   
 moneydlag1 -.0031223  .0021533      -1.45    0.147  
       foreign1 9445.946   16810.05        0.56       0.574   
          treeind 107257.5   51841.82        2.07       0.039   
       chemical 102724.5  54616.07       1.88     0.060  
       metalind 101975.8  45037.16        2.26       0.024   
   machineind 96802.42 40097.04      2.41   0.016  
  electric_a~s  51419.94  51471.81       1.00     0.318  
    radio_com  47701.24  32577.17        1.46       0.143   
 data_proc~g  51924.96 47895    1.08 0.279   
            d1997 8168.004 3699.186     2.21 0.027  
            d1999 4310.196 3804.516     1.13 0.258  
            d2001 2462.082 3168.164     0.78 0.437  
            d2002 -1071.322  3174.659      -0.34    0.736 
            d2003 -741.1177  3123.747      -0.24    0.813 
            d2004 617.1733 2975.605     0.21 0.836  
             _cons  -14494.81 16809.06      -0.86    0.389
-----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(524, 960) =    10.42            Prob > F = 0.0000  
 
Many dummies were dropped, as expected. The reason why some dummies were kept is that 
some firms, during the period 1995-2005, changed sector. Also the foreign dummy still exist, it is  
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of comparable magnitude as in the random effects regression and is still non-significant. 
Even if we should not rely too much on FE model, this helps us in giving another dimension to 
this issue. Being foreign does not change significantly R&D investment decisions not only for 
firms that remained foreign during all the years of the dataset, but also for the firms that changed 
nationality. This is the only reliable thing we see in this regression. As a Fixed Effects regression 
is as an OLS regression on the difference from the mean of each variable, it is not very surprising 
that we find unexpected results for sales and liquidity. For an analysis of the determinants of 
R&D expenditures, obviously GLS and RE are more reliable.  
 
In all these regressions we saw that the sectors most involved in R&D are the chemical, the office 
computer, the electric, the medical and the data processing sectors. These sectors will be defined 
the “high-investing sectors”. In order to relax the assumption that profits, size and liquidity have 
the same effect in all the sectors (an implicit assumption due to the use of sectorial dummy 
variables in an unique regression), we can run two separate regressions, one for the high-
investing sectors (from now on called HI) and one for the low investing sectors (LI, all the 
sample except the high-investing ones). Here the model is the same as before, but the regression 
will be run only for these sectors. I will run both a GLS as well as a RE model for both. 
 
High-investing sector: 
Linear regression  (GLS)                          Number of obs =     375 (125 firms) 
F( 10,   124) =    1.71             Prob > F      =  0.0864         R-squared     =  0.1127                            
R&D   Coeff.   Std. Error             t                       P>|t| 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
profitdlag1 .0121749 .0541153       0.22    0.822
   omsdlag1  .0163089    .0090013      1.81    0.072
moneydlag1  .0292478    .0154525      1.89    0.061
     foreign  35833.18 36623.59      0.98    0.330
       d1997 29933.79 23645.07     1.27    0.208
       d1999 7253.962 20268.01     0.36    0.721
       d2001 18784.06 18653.57     1.01    0.316
       d2002 5202.425 14179.61    0.37    0.714
       d2003 -831.9974 14396.73    -0.06    0.954
       d2004 -7546.812 12803.95   -0.59    0.557
       _cons | 21462.15 15254.17  1.41 0.162
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Low-investing sector: 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    1132 (402 firms) 
F( 10,   401) =   21.54           Prob > F      =  0.0000      R-squared     =  0.4906                              
R&D   Coeff.   Std. Error              t                            P>|t| 
---------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
profitdlag1 -.0088394   .0110429        -0.80       0.424   
    omsdlag1 .0064099  .0011451      5.60     0.000  
moneydlag1    .0078385    .0046661       1.68       0.094
     foreign  783.8006 4396.726 0.18  0.859     
       d1997 -21.3015 3287.44 -0.01 0.995     
       d1999 3275.725 3144.656 1.04 0.298    
       d2001 -3442.787 2083.796  -1.65    0.099    
       d2002 -1403.831 1474.829  -0.95    0.342    
       d2003 -54.07687 1391.742  -0.04    0.969    
       d2004 -447.766 958.4279 -0.47 0.641    
       _cons  9100.774  3150.187  2.89   0.004      
-----------------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Profits never had a significant impact on R&D, neither in GSL nor RE, neither in the HI nor in 
the LI. This finding supports even more the idea that R&D is performed for its expected returns, 
which do not change over time. 
 
Size, interestingly, has a much higher impact in the HI, but is much more significant in the LI. 
That suggests that firms in the LI rely much more on their own size when they decide how much 
to invest in R&D, while firms in the HI probably rely more on other factors. That means that the 
firms in the high-investing sectors, even if they spend a higher share of their sales in R&D (larger 
coefficient), their investments in R&D have a much higher variance (not significant). This view 
is supported also by the R2: in the HI it is only 11%, while in the LI is reaches the 49%. This 
dramatic difference is due mostly to the different impact of the size in these two sectors (there is 
a great difference in the variance of the sales coefficient in these two regressions). One 
explanation for the fact that firms in LI rely much more on accounting variables can be found in 
Nelson and Winter's book “An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change” (1982). Here they 
present a serious critique to microeconomic theory and propose an evolutionary paradigm, where 
economic agents rely on routines and do not behave optimally. They found many empirical 
evidence for that. The results of the LI regression (high significance of sales and low coefficient) 
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suggests the existence of routines too. The fact that routines exist in the LI more than in the HI is 
very logical. In the HI it is much more important to analyze carefully the quality of the project, so 
the R&D of each year will be less dependent on size (or other financial variables) than in the LI. 
In one year without good projects a firm could invest a little amount in R&D, but in the next year, 
if there is the possibility of a good project, R&D could rise sharply. In LI, on the contrary, the 
importance of R&D is more limited, so it is less costly to invest in R&D following some simple 
“rule of thumb”. A rule of thumb could be, for example, spending in R&D a fixed amount of 
sales, say 4%. The high R2 and the high significance of sales in LI regression seem to confirm 
this hypothesis. 
 
The results for liquidity unfortunately are not clear: the GLS regression gives a high coefficient 
for it, but the RE regression gives a not significantly negative coefficient (see Appendix 1). On 
the other hand, in the LI the results are quite small (the coefficient is 0.0078 in the GLS or 0.005 
in the RE), but always highly significant. Also this result is very consistent with the conclusions 
drawn for the sales coefficient. In all the regressions above the foreign dummy is not significant. 
The time dummies show the decreasing trend in particular in the HI, meaning that the decrease in 
time of real R&D was due primarily to a drop in the HI. 
 
Another question of interest is to investigate the relation between all these independent variables 
and not the total level of R&D, which is what I have done until now, but just the relationship 
between them and the probability of being a firm which invests in R&D. In order to do that 
properly, we should run a probit or a logit regression, to avoid the problems that we could face by 
running a simple OLS. The clearest problem is that with a linear probability model (OLS) we 
could infer a probability bigger than 1 or smaller than 0, which obviously cannot be accepted. 
Also, heteroscedasticity problems will arise. In order to keep into account that we deal with a 
panel data, I ran a probit model allowing for autocorrelation in the error term for the same firm 
(clustered probit). The model here is yi,t= c+α*πi,t-1+β*Si,t-1+γ*Li,t-1+φ*fi,t+σk*mk,i,t+τt*Tt +ai+εi,t, 
where yit={0,1}, yit=0 if firm i does not invest in R&D in time t, yit=1 otherwise. The probability 
of yit=1, which is what we are interested in, is given by P(y=1)=P(εi,t >-xB)=1-P(εi,t <-xB)=         
1-G(-xB)=G(xB), treating all the independent variables in a vectorial form. After having run the 
probit model, I will also compute the marginal effects of these variables in the center of the 
distribution. 
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Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =       3094 (899 firms) 
Log pseudolikelihood = -1756.5575                 Pseudo R2       =     0.1791 
Antall_R&D     Coeff.   Std. Error   z             P>|z| 
-----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    profitdlag1    5.68e-07 3.89e-07 1.46   0.144   
     salesdlag1  2.98e-07 6.18e-08 4.81   0.000   
  moneydlag1 -1.79e-07 1.34e-07 -1.33    0.183  
          foreign  -.3340844 .1163516 -2.87 0.004
    tobaccoind  -.7700767 .350863 -2.19 0.028  
        graphics  -.9918995 .1863598 -5.32 0.000
       chemical  .9376558 .3042538 3.08  0.002  
           plastic  .4150415 .2738931 1.52  0.130  
non_metal_ s  .5466775 .2402784 2.28  0.023  
        metalind   .3688631 .1718527 2.15  0.032
   machineind  .6408444 .2093374 3.06  0.002
  electric_a~s  1.299171 .2481487     5.24    0.000  
radio_comm  .6808776 .2906111     2.34    0.019  
 medical_p~d  1.292219 .4597342 2.81  0.005
motor_vehi~s  -.0522788 .1504954 -0.35 0.728
     detail_sale  -1.526592 .5797403 -2.63 0.008
  sea_transp~t  -.7351366 .1794082 -4.10 0.000
   air_transp~t  -1.486339 .5791247 -2.57 0.010
    transport_s  -1.269162 .1926872 -6.59 0.000
 post_telecom  -.4224937 .2741719 -1.54 0.123
  data_proc~g  -.1008675 .19665 -0.51 0.608   
            d1997  -.2434647 .0951178 -2.56 0.010
            d1999 -.4572086 .0978117 -4.67 0.000
            d2001 -.2173162 .0831877 -2.61 0.009
            d2002 -.2680879 .0802577 -3.34 0.001
            d2003  .0166395 .0747737 0.22 0.824
            d2004  -.0301053 .0587838 -0.51 0.609
            _cons    .0802248 .1183917 0.68 0.498  
------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   
 Marginal effects after probit 
      y  = Pr(antall_R&D) (predict) = 0.56550625 
variable     Dy/dx     Std. Error          z                        P>|z| 
 51
-------------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      pr~dlag1    2.24e-07 .00000    1.47   0.143  
   salesdlag1    1.17e-07 .00000    4.88   0.000   
   moneyd~1   -7.03e-08 .00000   -1.34   0.182  
       foreign* -.1323953 .04599   -2.88   0.004  
    tobacc~d* -.2930215 .11808   -2.48   0.013  
     graphics*  -.3689425 .05706   -6.47   0.000  
    chemical*   .306916 .0706       4.35    0.000   
        plastic*   .1539292 .09301    1.66    0.098  
  non_me~s*    .1978015 .07613    2.60    0.009  
    metalind* .1389736 .06079 2.29   0.022   
  machin~d*  .2278895 .06283    3.63    0.000    
     electr~s*   .3704048 .03859    9.60    0.000  
   radio_~n* .2371163 .08269  2.87  0.004  
  medica~d* .3673701 .06729 5.46   0.000  
  motor_~s* -.0206351 .05957   -0.35    0.729  
     detail~e* -.4801267 .09356   -5.13    0.000
     sea_tr~t* -.2829438 .06244   -4.53    0.000
      air_tr~t* -.4751331 .10006   -4.75    0.000
    transp~s* -.4406496 .04688   -9.40    0.000
   post_t~m*    -.16721 .10617   -1.57    0.115  
   data_p~g*  -.039935 .07822   -0.51    0.610  
        d1997* -.0965945 .03776 -2.56    0.011
        d1999* -.1808105 .03796 -4.76    0.000
        d2001* -.0861626 .03307 -2.61    0.009
        d2002* -.1063372 .03186 -3.34    0.001
        d2003* .0065422 .02937 0.22   0.824  
        d2004* -.0118686 .02322 -0.51    0.609
---------------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Interestingly, we find that the liquidity coefficient is not significant anymore (and it is even 
negative). This can circumscribe the importance of the cash constraints only on the total 
investments provided that there is an investment. Liquidity indeed has a positive effect in the 
regression of the invested R&D, but has no positive impact on the probability of investing. 
The reason could be that when a firm decides whether to invest in R&D, it does not consider the 
present liquidity, but the long term expected returns and costs of investing in R&D. In this case, it 
 52
is logical that current liquidity does not have a significant effect in deciding whether to invest or 
not. 
 
Profits are still not significant, as before, while sales continue being significant. Differently from 
the R&D regression, a very big number of the coefficients of the dummy variables is significant: 
while they were not significant in explaining the amount of the R&D investments, they are  in 
explaining the probability of investing in it. So the firms in these sectors do not behave 
differently from the firms in the primary sector, ceteris paribus, if they invest, but they are more 
likely to invest than primary sector firms. The only sector that had a non-significant impact on the 
invested amount provided that R&D>0 but has a negative impact on the probability of investing 
is the graphic sector (whose coefficient in the R&D regression was dropped as not significant). 
The sectorial dummies with the largest coefficients in the R&D regression were the chemical 
sector, the leather sector, the office computers, the medical apparates and electric apparates. 
These variables are still positive and significant here too. One reason for that could be that in our 
dataset we just have firms with more than 100 employees. Firms of these sectors with so many 
workers normally must invest in R&D to find new products and survive in the market (let us just 
think to the leather sector or the electric apparates). 
 
We see that being foreign, even if it does not reduce the average amount spent, reduces the 
probability of investing. This reduction is around 13% and is significant. It means that foreign 
firms in Norway ceteris paribus spend the same, if they invest, but have a lower probability of 
investing.  
 
Dividing the dataset between high-investing and low-investing sector, we note that the impact of 
the foreign dummy is much stronger in the high-investing sector. In it, its marginal effect is -
0.274 (t-value=-3.12), in the low-investing sector it is -0.058 (t-value=-1.17) (see Appendix 2). In 
both sectors, on the other hand, it does not affect the expected amount, provided that the firm 
invests. 
 
An interesting extension of these results would be the construction of a model that can embody 
both the impact that the independent variables have on the probability of investing in R&D and 
on the expected invested amount. One of the candidates is the Tobit model. It assumes that the 
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independent variables have a proportional effect on both the probability that the dependent 
variable is positive and on its value when it is positive. Looking at the Probit regression and on 
(truncated) OLS on the positive R&D we see these things: profits have a not significant impact 
on both P(R&D>0) and on E[R&D|R&D>0], while sales have a positive and significant impact 
on both, around half times the impact of profitability. Liquidity can give some problems, as it is 
not significant for the probability of investing while it is positive and significant for the R&D 
amount, but the worse concerns come from the foreign dummy. It has, indeed, a different 
behaviour: it affects negatively and significantly the probability of investing (its marginal effect 
in the probit regression was -0.1324, so on average it reduced the probability of investing of 
13.24%), while it has almost no effect on the amount invested. 
 
The dummy variables have not clearly the same or opposite effects, in general, but the most 
important ones (chemical, electric apparates, radio and medical equipment) still have in both 
regressions a positive and significant coefficient. The other dummy variables do not behave in a 
too distant manner from the theoretical prescriptions to run a consistent Tobit, but the behaviour 
of the foreign dummy would make it inconsistent. Furthermore, the Shapiro-Wilk test for 
normality rejects this hypothesis - residuals distributions seems like a normal, but with a long 
right side tail – and Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity rejects the hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity too. 
 
Another candidate to include in the same model both P(R&D>0) and E[R&D|R&D>0] is the 
Heckman two-step procedure. Nevertheless this is not the best setting to apply it. Here we do not 
face a variable seen only under special circumstances (like wages for working people), but an 
actual variable, which can be directly chosen by the firms. That's why it is better to run a two-part 
model (Manning, Duan and Rogers, 1987). It consists in running a probit or logit, for sample 
inclusion, followed by a regression on the positive values of y, like it was done here. 
When the goal is to analyze an underlying regression model or to predict the value of the 
dependent variable that would be observed in the absence of selection the Heckman model is 
more appropriate. When the goal is to predict an actual response, like here, the two part model is 
usually a better choice. A part the theoretical debates, also a practical issue arises. In the 
Heckman procedure, unless the set of regressors in the E[Y|Y>0] equation (the “regression 
equation”) is a strict subset of the set of regressors in the P(Y>0) equation (the “selection 
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equation”), there are serious problems of multicollinearity. The coefficients of the regression 
equation, indeed, are identified only due to the nonlinearity of the inverse Mills ratio 
(Wooldridge, 2002). Running a regression on all the sample, on the high-investing sector and on 
the low-investing one with the Heckman procedure, these theoretical predictions are indeed 
confirmed. Coefficients are never significant, except the constant term and, in the high-investing 
sector, the revenues in determining the probability of investing. So both from a theoretical as well 
as from a practical point of view the two-part model is a better choice. 
 
For a full picture of the relationship between foreign ownership and R&D investments, we can 
look at the summary statistics of national and the foreign firms.        
 
                 NATIONAL firms*time, real sales 
                 N                                        6889                   Mean                      712263.708                   
                  Std Deviation          5225772.47                 Variance                 2.73087E13
 
                                                          FOREIGN firms*time,  real sales 
                   N                                    1376                     Mean                    951806.477                      
                   Std Deviation       2565145.83                     Variance             6.57997E12
 
                                                     NATIONAL investing firms*time, real R&D  
                  N                                       1895                   Mean                      22697.6794                    
                  Std Deviation          73165.1132                 Variance                5353133787
 
                                           FOREIGN investing firms*time, real R&D 
                  N                                           396                Mean                         30445.2847                
                  Std Deviation            78994.6614              Variance                   6240156532
 
  
Ratio foreign investing firms*time in R&D to total foreign firms:        396/841=0.471. 
Ratio national investing firms*time in R&D to total national firms: 1895/3738=0.507. 
 
From these statistics we see that foreign investing firms actually invest much more than the 
Norwegian ones, and they do so because they are much bigger, on average. On sales value they 
are 33% bigger than the national ones, and their R&D investments are 34% larger. Being foreign, 
as we saw in the regression results, does not have effects of the amount invested, if the firm 
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invests, but has an effect on whether a firm will invest in R&D. Even if they are on average 
bigger (+33%), the probability that one of these invests is lower (47.1% against 50.7%). This 
suggests the fact that a foreign company prefers to invest in R&D in its own country. The fact 
that, then, that, if it invests, it invests an amount as high as a Norwegian firm would do, makes 
more realistic the theory of R&D sunk costs (Sutton, 1991, Santos, 2008). If there were no fixed 
costs, we would not expect a drop in the probability of investing. A sunk cost in R&D can be 
creating a laboratory and finding expert personnel, a variable cost can be beginning a new project 
(hiring additional researchers, etc). The fact that foreign firms have a lower probability of 
investing means there exist also many multinational firms that centralize R&D in  their own 
country. 
 
These findings can have interesting policy implications. If the government had the intention of 
raising Norwegian aggregate R&D, probably it should focus more on the sunk costs rather than 
on the variable costs. Doing so, it may make foreign firms willing to invest. If they are, they are 
expected to invest as much as a Norwegian one. As they are on average bigger, they will 
probably also invest more, after they have decided to invest. Furthermore, this will avoid the 
distortion toward the basic research due to R&D subsidies, pointed out by Rosen (1991). On the 
other hand, Acs and Audretsch (1988) showed that government-subsidized R&D is less 
productive than private R&D. Even a more basic question could also arise: is it really convenient 
for a government to subsidize R&D? Subsidizing it means that governments thinks that R&D 
creates positive externalities, which is quite pacific in the literature, but whose amount is difficult 
to estimate. Subsidizing R&D and, especially, its fixed part may create serious problems of moral 
hazard. We can think to the findings on the 'foreign' dummy as a 'diagnosys': for the 'treatment', if 
it is really worth to implement it, welfare analysis will be needed and could be an interesting 
development of this work.  
 
 
 
3.3 R&D/sales regressions 
 
Here I will analyse the impact of the size of the firm on the ratio R&D/sales. The following 
analysis is a test of the externality reduction and the scale effect argumentations. The first states 
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that the bigger the firm is, the more it can appropriate its own efforts (Klepper, 1996); the second 
that there may be economies of scale in performing R&D. Furthermore we expect a bigger firm 
to be less risk-averse. 
 
On the other side, other literature says that the percentage R&D/sales should be negatively 
correlated with the size of the firm, as marginal returns on R&D are decreasing, and investing 
after some point is not profitable (Jaruzelski, 2005). 
 
These following regressions are just very preliminar: I do not include any sectorial, time or 
foreign dummy, nor profits or liquidity. I will use them for a first impression of the relationship 
R&D/sales and sales 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    1708 (525 firms) 
                                                                  R-squared     =  0.0012            
R&D/sales       Coeff.      Std. Error     t         P>|t| 
-----------------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    salesdlag1  -3.87e-10 1.91e-10 -2.03 0.043   
            _cons  .0337573     .0030606        11.03 0.000 
------------------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =      1708 (525 firms) 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0002         between = 0.0003              overall = 0.0012           
R&D/sales       Coeff.      Std. Error     t         P>|t| 
-----------------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
     salesdlag1  -1.96e-10 2.96e-10 -0.66 0.508   
            _cons  .0318631 .0029073 10.96 0.000 
------------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Here I regressed the ratio of R&D/sales on sales. We can see that sales revenues coefficient is 
negative and significant in the FGLS regression, while it is not significantly negative in the 
Random Effects regression. A Fixed Effects regression gives the same results as the Random 
Effects one. In no case, then, there is a positive relationship between size and R&D/sales. 
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This result would reduces a lot the importance of the argumentation of the externality reduction: 
the amount spent on R&D, if this was the case, keeping R&D productivity the same, should be 
positively correlated with the sales. But R&D productivity, as a firm increases its own R&D 
efforts, normally decreases. On the contrary, this regression may support the diminishing returns 
argumentation, or the proportional relationship between R&D and R&D/sales. This very 
preliminar result seems to suggest, anyway, that the externality reduction is not stronger than the 
diminishing returns argument. 
 
I have divided the sample in 4 subsamples, depending on the sales volume. The first included just 
the firms in the top percentile for sales value, the second the firms between 90th and 99th 
percentiles, the third the ones between the 10th and the 90th ones and the fourth the smallest 
firms. I considered also the top 1%, even we have just 23 observations, because the firms in this 
percentile invest the 13% of the total real amount of R&D.  
 
With random and fixed effects I obtained even a significantly positive relationship in the 
subsample 10%-90% (but negative for the top percentile) and no significant effect in the other  
subsamples. With a simple clustered regression I always find not significant coefficients. 
So we cannot reject (at 95% confidence interval) the hypotesis of proportionality between R&D 
and sales. This result can embody the two contrasting effects of the externality reduction and of 
the diminishing returns in R&D, making our results very similar to the ones found by Cohen and 
Klepper (1996, b). 
 
Here it is the final model, with past profitability, sales, liquidity, and the same dummies as 
before. As in the R&D regression, here the model is y’i,t=c+α*πi,t-1+β*Si,t-
1+γ*Li,t1+φ*fi,t+σk*mk,i,t+τt*Tt+εit, where y’it is R&D/sales, or, in the terms of the previous 
models, yit/Sit. 
 
 
 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    1507 (525 firms) 
R-squared     =  0.2108                             Root MSE      =  .06593                           
R&D/sales       Coeff.      Std.                t                          P>|t| 
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Error 
-------------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
     profitdlag1  -1.21e-08 1.64e-08       -0.74  0.463    
      salesdlag1  1.05e-09 9.22e-10       1.14  0.257   
   moneydlag1  2.60e-09 3.23e-09       0.80  0.421    
           foreign | .0132236 .011226       1.18  0.239    
     tobaccoind |   -.0273084 .0113736     -2.40 0.017    
        chemical | .0424102 .0166892       2.54   0.011     
    machineind  .0376916 .0165228       2.28   0.023     
 office_com~r  .0380129 .0076749       4.95   0.000     
    electric_a~s  .0397415 .0090661       4.38   0.000     
  radio_comm   .1269145 .0328097       3.87   0.000     
 medical_pr~d  .073903    .0113655      6.50   0.000     
motor_vehi~s |   .0197899 .0095939      2.06   0.040     
 water_elec~s |   -.0092833 .0042763    -2.17 0.030    
     detail_sale |   -.0100444 .004877   -2.06 0.040    
 data_proce~g  .1095203 .0297379      3.68   0.000     
             d1997   -.0009059    .0065956      -0.14   0.891     
             d1999  -.0026242 .006791   -0.39 0.699    
             d2001  .003023    .0061391      0.49   0.623    
             d2002  .002915    .0056743      0.51   0.608    
             d2003  .0044148 .0059602      0.74   0.459    
             d2004  -.0008528 .0049269    -0.17 0.863    
              _cons  .0094037 .0077368      1.22   0.225    
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Also in these regressions it comes out that sales volume does not affect negatively the ratio 
R&D/sales. Profits and liquidity does not impact the ratio R&D/sales significantly. The foreign 
dummy still has a not significant impact (in the clustered regression) on R&D/sales. In the 
random effects regression it seems to have even a positive relationship, but this is hardly true. We 
saw the descriptive statistics of foreign and national firms both in terms of sales as well as of 
R&D, and we found that foreign firms are 33% bigger and invest, if they invest, 34% more. It 
seems unlikely that the foreign dummy, then, can have a significantly positive impact on 
R&D/sales. Probably the reason must be found in a correlation of the unobserved effects with 
some explanatory variable that affects the consistency of random effects model. In this case, then, 
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we should rely more on the clustered regression (GLS allowing for autocorrelated errors within 
the same firm over time). 
 
The most important sectorial dummies here are the same as in the R&D regression, i.e. the  
chemical, the office computers, the electric, the medical instruments and the radio 
communication sectors. This confirms that firms in these sectors invest more not because of 
bigger average dimension, but just because of the environment where they operate. In this 
regression the coefficients mean the average difference in R&D/sales from the primary sector. 
Ceteris paribus, then, if a firm in the primary sector invests k% of its sales in R&D, a chemical 
firm will invest (k+4.24)%. 
 
If we wanted to create, like in the R&D regression, a unique model with both P(R&D>0) and 
E[R&D|R&D>0], we would face the same problems as before. Tobit model would still face the 
non-normality of the error term, the heteroscedasticity and the different behaviour of the foreign 
dummy in the probability of investing and on the invested amount. Furthermore, it would have a 
new problem. This comes from the sales variable. It has still a positive effect on P(R&D>0), but 
it has now a not significant impact on E[R&D/sales|R&D>0]. Tobit model would then give not 
consistent estimates. Heckman procedure shows the same drawbacks it showed in the R&D 
regression, so here too the best is to have a two-part model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Relationship R&D-Investment and Success 
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 4.1 Relationship R&D-physical investments 
 
In this section there will be the analysis of the relationship between R&D and physical 
investments, in order to test which one of the different theories illustrated in the first chapter may 
fit Norwegian data. Lach-Schankerman (1989) and Lach-Rob (1996) state that there is a causal 
relationship from R&D to physical investments. Tovainen-Stoneman (1998) assess the opposite 
relationship, while Chiao (2001) found a contemporaneous two-ways relationship. 
Here we have the descriptive statistics of Norwegian firms' R&D and investments. 
 
Variable  Mean  Std. Error  Obs. (firms) 
R&D  24096.91  74551.89  2271 (797) 
Investment  26119.90  120367.5 4266 (1148) 
 
The mean real investment in R&D is 24,096,910 NOK, with a std. dev. of  74,551,890, and the 
mean real investment in physical capital is  26,119,900 NOK, with a std. dev. of 120,367,500. 
Here we have a similar finding to Lach-Schankerman (1989) and Lach-Rob (1996). While the 
mean value of R&D and investments are very close, the variance of investment is much larger 
than the one of R&D. This seems to confirm their explanation of technological progress. R&D is 
undertaken for the expectation of profitable innovations, but a successful innovation occurs 
randomly. When it occurs, in order to make it exploitable, physical investments become 
necessary. That is the reason why the variance of investment is much higher than the one of 
R&D. R&D, indeed, as it is performed just for the expectations of useful innovations, is very 
persistent:  
Corr.  R&Dt R&Dt‐1  R&Dt  R&Dt‐1 
R&Dt  1   
R&Dt‐1  0.8963  1 
 
On the other hand, investments, in Lach-Rob and Lach-Schankerman explanation, are performed 
partly as a consequence to successful innovations. So we should expect a lower autocorrelation in 
investment rather than in R&D. Indeed in our dataset we find:                   
Corr Invt Invt‐1  Invt   Invt‐1
Invt  1   
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Invt‐1  0.7834  1 
 
This correlation shows that investment is time persistent (Chiao, 2001), but that it is less 
persistent than R&D. This seems to strengthen the argumentations of Lach-Schankerman and 
Lach-Rob. 
 
Furthermore, both a dynamic simultaneous system as well as a reduced-form VAR model with 
our data, using a fixed effects procedure, show a Granger-causality from R&D to physical 
investment, but not the other way round. The best procedure is probably a Fixed Effects model, 
as we should disregard all those unobserved factors different from R&D and physical investment. 
This will let us focus just on the interrelations between them. 
A dynamic simultaneous system is a system of two equations: 
1) R&Dt on invt, R&Dt-1 and invt-1,  so the equation is yi,t=c+α*xi,t+β*yi,t-1+γ*xi,t-1+ai+εi,t, where 
xit is the physical investment for firm i in time t, yit the R&D of firm i in time t and ai’s the fixed 
effects. 
2) Invt on R&Dt, invt-1 and R&Dt-1., so the equation is xi,t=k+a*yi,t+b*xi,t-1+d*yi,t-1+ui,t, where ui,t 
is the error term of this second equation. 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       736 (298 firms) 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0591                         between = 0.6665                                        overall = 0.6661                   
R&D      Coeff.   Std. Error     t                           P>|t|
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
               invd  .0050462 .0063999 0.79 0.431   
        R&Ddlag1  .084723     .0361412 2.34 0.020   
           invdlag1  -.015275 .0041994 -3.64  0.000   
            _cons  20174.1 856.1953 23.56  0.000  
-----------------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       736 (298 firms) 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1881       between = 0.0213                 overall = 0.0502                               
Inv     Coeff.  Std. Error    t                          P>|t|
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
          R&Dd  .2828196 .3586871  0.79  0.431  
      invdlag1  -.1032823 .0315264 -3.28 0.001 
   R&Ddlag1  2.159913 .2518057  8.58  0.000 
         _cons  -13421.17 9649.276 -1.39 0.165 
-----------------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
We can see that there is no significant contemporaneous relationship between R&D and 
investment, but past R&D is significant in explaining current investment, while the opposite 
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seems to hold in a negative fashion. The negative coefficient, anyway, should not scare as it is 
very small (-0.015). The significance is due to the very low standard error. 
On the other hand, past R&D seems to have a very strong impact on current investment. A 
coefficient of 2.16 seems extremely high. This may be due to a multicollinearity problem. 
Current R&D and past R&D, indeed, have a correlation ρ=0.8963. 
One way to avoid this is using a reduced form VAR model. This approach is very similar to the 
dynamic simultaneous system, but it avoids using the other contemporaneous variable in 
estimating each equation. It consists, in other words, in solving the simultaneous system and 
letting each dependent variable be explained by just the lagged values of itself and the other one. 
So we will have:  
1) R&Dt on R&Dt-1 and invt-1, so y,t=c+a*yi,t-1+b*xi,t-1+εi,t. 
2) Invt on invt-1 and R&Dt-1, so y,t=c+a*yi,t-1+b*xi,t-1+ui,t. 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       763 (307 firms) 
R-sq:  within  = 0.3604                  between = 0.7898                   overall = 0.8175                                                                                       
R&D       Coeff.   Std. Error     t          P>|t| 
-------------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 R&Ddlag1 .3272979    .0208918    15.67   0.000    
     invdlag1  -.0110822 .0042337 -2.62 0.009    
         _cons  14737.2  620.8094 23.74 0.000   
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1156 (443 firms) 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1141                between = 0.5763                 overall = 0.5385                                         
Inv      Coeff.   Std. Error     t          P>|t| 
-------------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   invdlag1  .3029921 .0336094 9.02 0.000   
R&Ddlag1 .5319937 .1535199 3.47 0.001    
        _cons  12017.62 4799.954 2.50 0.013    
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
In the reduced-form VAR, which by construction does not consider the contemporaneous 
relationship between the two dependent variables, we see that the lagged values of each of them 
are highly significant for its current value, but the core result of the dynamic system still holds: 
past R&D can explain a part of current investment and this is a one-way relationship. 
These results are confirmed even by a fixed effects regression of R&D on only past investments 
(coefficient: 0.49, t-value: 4.32), while lagged investments (alone) do not show any influence on 
present R&D (coefficient:-0.004, t-value: -0.54). 
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4.2. Effects of R&D 
 
As in this dataset I have found quite a strong evidence for Lach-Schankerman and Lach-Rob 
theses, I will analyze the success indicators of a firm by treating R&D and investments as 
complements, as they did in their own works.  
 
Fixed effects and not random effects regression will be used, again, because our goal is to focus 
on the differential impact of the explanatory variables on the success indicators. So the feature of 
FE of taking away all firm-specific characteristics is not a limitation but a “cleaning device” for 
our analysis. It lets us focus just on the impact of R&D and physical investments on the success 
indicators of a firm. 
 
Two of the most common indicators of the success of a firm are the sales growth and the profits. 
In the following regressions I will deal with both of them and with many modifications of the 
explanatory variables, in order to have a fuller picture of these relationships. Another success 
device of a firm is the innovation, but unfortunately it was not possible to have patents data. That 
is the reason why it was necessary to analyze the impact of R&D directly on sales growth and 
profits. I had to jump the middle step of the productivity of R&D, normally proxied by the 
number of patents, and link directly the input (R&D) to the output (profits or sales growth). 
 
Even if they are not shown here, also GLS regressions were run. They gave basically the same 
results as the FE model, which is probably more suited for our goals. As I aim at analyzing the 
differential impact of R&D on sales growth and profits, it is better to take away the unobserved 
effects that affect the success indicators of a firm. This is the reason why only the FE regressions 
will be shown here. In this regression I estimate the impact of R&D (and physical investments) 
on sales growth. The model is then ∆Sit/Sit-1=c+α*yit-1+β*yit-2+γ*xit-1+δ*xit-2+ai+εit, where Sit are 
the sales of firm i in year t and, as before, yit is the R&D expenditure and xit the physical 
investment. 
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Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       458 (231 firms) 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0488                         between = 0.0036                                        overall = 0.0003                                                
Sales growth      Coeff.   Std. Error     t          P>|t| 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R&D_salesl~1  2.742449 .9094749 3.02 0.003    
R&D_salesl~2  -.1148845 .6964183 -0.16 0.869    
         invdlag1  1.36e-08    2.32e-07        0.06   0.953    
         invdlag2  -2.52e-07 2.00e-07 -1.26 0.209    
              _cons  -.0137986 .0450029  -0.31 0.759    
-----------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Fixed effects method confirms that there is some kind of a positive relationship between sales 
growth and R&D/sales (Kandybin-Kihn, 2004, Mansfield, 1981). To have a clearer picture, I 
regressed the sales growth on the increase in R&D/sales ratio. The model here, then, becomes 
∆Sit/Sit-1=c+α*∆yit-1/yit-2+β*∆xit-1/xit-2+ai+εit. 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       726 (297 firms) 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0393                         between = 0.0805                                       overall = 0.0475                                         
Sales growth      Coeff.   Std. Error                t                     P>|t| 
---------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
R&D_salesg~1  -.0302138 .0073653        -4.10 0.000  
   inv_salesg~1  .0013853 .0016236         0.85  0.394   
               _cons  .0597111 .0095533         6.25  0.000   
----------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Here we see that an acceleration in the ratio R&D/sales should lower the increase in sales of the 
following year. A reason for that can be that a firm may invest much in R&D in order to develop 
some new product or process; after that it achieves the success, it can lower by much its own 
R&D expenditures and use the innovation to sell more in the market. Also this finding supports 
the hypothesis that R&D can help in increasing sales. 
The other side of the success of a firm are the profits. Here I will analyse the relationship of the 
ratio profit/sales on past R&D and investments (2 periods). 
The model then is: πit/Sit=c+α*yit-1/Sit /+β*yit-2/Sit +γ*xit-1/Sit +δ*xit-2/Sit +ai+εit, 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       458 (231 firms) 
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R-sq:  within  = 0.0107                         between = 0.0097                                  overall = 0.0013                                         
 F(4,223)           =      0.60           Prob > F           =    0.6620 
Profit/sales      Coeff.   Std. Error                  t                      P>|t| 
-------------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
R&D_salesl~1  .1358546 .2953397           0.46   0.646   
R&D_salesl~2  .2431473 .2287758           1.06   0.289   
   inv_salesl~1  .0404189 .1357984           0.30   0.766   
   inv_salesl~2  .1158832 .1559487           0.74   0.458   
              _cons .02705 .0141658           1.91 0.057
---------------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Here we cannot see any significant positive relationship between past R&D and current profits. 
Running this regression with just one lag (i.e. current profits on past year’s R&D and investments 
– this regression was omitted), the fraction of sales revenues devoted to R&D is negatively and 
significantly correlated with the ratio profits/sales of the following year. This seems to suggest 
that the best performing firms are the ones that invest less than the average in R&D.  These 
different results can be due to the high collinearity between current and past R&D, as its 
autocorrelation was near to 90%. Anyway here R&D does not seem to have important impacts on 
the short term ratio profits/sales. The F-test, furthermore, cannot reject the non-significance of all 
the independent variables. 
 
The analysis of total profits on total R&D and investments (model: πit =c+α*yit-1+β*yit-2+γ*xit-1 
+δ*xit-2+ai+εit) seems, on the contrary, to give different results: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       458 (231 groups) 
R-sq:  within  = 0.3964                         between = 0.0772                                        overall = 0.1224                                         
F(4,223)           =     36.61       Prob > F           =    0.0000 
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Profits      Coeff.     Std. Error           t                               P>|t| 
-------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 R&Ddlag1  2.759243 .8181894 3.37 0.001     
 R&Ddlag2  1.23574 .5017919 2.46 0.015      
    invdlag1  -.4927913 .1000032     -4.93     0.000    
    invdlag2  .6866688 .089166  7.70  0.000     
        _cons  -40967.96 24293.5     -1.69      0.093   
---------------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Here there seems to be a positive relationship between profits and R&D, but we should be quite 
prudent. The collinearity between current and past R&D, indeed, was very high and the 
coefficients seem really large: an increase in 1000 NOK in R&D today should yield 2759 NOK 
in profits tomorrow. This obviously cannot be trusted. Indeed, if we just use the lags at pace 1 
this relationship disappears: 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1194 (458 firms) 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1252      between = 0.4330             overall = 0.2974                                         
Profits      Coeff.   Std. Error     t          P>|t| 
-------------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  R&Ddlag1 -.3229957 .1884672 -1.71 0.087  
     invdlag1  -.4541422 .0449577 -10.10  0.000   
          _cons  79988.24 6151.883 13.00  0.000   
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Also here it is sufficient a slight change in the model, like adding another lagged value, to change 
the results dramatically. The positive relationship that appeared before now is vanished. 
 
Many other kinds of regressions, that here have been omitted, show no positive relation between 
profit growth and R&D/sales growth of the previous period (according with Kandybin-Kihn, 
2004, and Von Braun, 1996) or between profit growth and R&D/sales of the previous period. 
Neither with R&D of the past period nor with R&D of the two past periods it is possible to find 
any relationship between profit growth and R&D/sales. This can seem a “bad” result, but on the 
contrary it is useful to unveil some of the common places around R&D. Jaruzelski stated that 
'success cannot be bought' and our findings confirm his view and his data. 
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The only variable that seems positively affected by R&D is sales volume. In the high-investing 
sector, the relationships R&D-success is stronger than in all the sample, but still not always 
significant. It appears to be positive for the increase in sales, like in all the sample, but also for 
profitability, even if just at 90% level of significance. While regressing profits on R&D and 
investments in the high-investing and low-investing sector, we note that R&D, in the most 
intensive sectors in R&D, seems to have a quite positive effect on profits (even if not at 95% 
significance level). On the contrary, investments do not seem to have a positive impact. In both 
sectors R&D had a stronger impact (even if not significant) than investments. In the low-
investing one, R&D seems to have a non-positive relationship with profits. Investments also seem 
not to affect it positively. 
 
In our dataset we find that R&D seems really a weak instrument to achieve success, especially if 
in such a short horizon of time (two years). It would have been possible to add more lags, but our 
dataset does not contain the R&D expenditures for years 1996,1998 and 2000. Using three lags 
would have reduced the dataset only to firms of years 2004 and 2005 (and only to those without 
missing values). The loss of information would have been too high compared to the advantage of 
seeing R&D effects for one year more. Furthermore, this would have made worse the problem of 
multicollinearity between R&D and its lagged values. 
  
Treating these regressions with a fixed effects approach gave similar results to the simple 
clustered regression, which makes us believe that we did not find any relationship not because of 
just an econometric bad setting of the model, but because there is really not such a kind of 
relation. There seems to be no solid relationship between any of the success indicators of a firm 
(sales, profits, both normalized to sales or not, both in differential or in absolute terms) and past 
R&D (in all the variants as above). These results accord to literature. The only two significant 
findings is that R&D/sales seem to help sales growth (like in Kandybin-Kihn, 2004) and that 
R&D seems to cause the physical investments. 
 
In order to concretely verify the regression results, we can analyze the descriptive statistics of our 
sample, in relation with the success indicators and R&D. We can also test some of the empirical 
claims of the literature. An interesting result is that the firms in the bottom 10% in R&D/sales 
ratio have a worst performance than the others (Jaruzelski, 2005). 
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                                 all the sample (R&D=0 included) 
                                  Variable:  PROFIT_SALES                
            N                         4532                 Mean                           0.02384052         
            Std Deviation      0.74681682      Variance                      0.55773536
   
 
                            all the sample (R&D>0) 
                              Variable:  PROFIT_SALES      
             N                         2267                     Mean                        0.04237385
             Std Deviation      0.34727667          Variance                    0.12060108
 
 
               top 10% in R&D/sales 
                           Variable:  PROFIT_SALES       
             N                         226                 Mean                            0.015799  
             Std Deviation      0.86555876    Variance                      0.74919197
 
 
                                          mid 10-90% 
                             Variable:  PROFIT_SALES   
             N                         1814                  Mean                         0.04316127    
             Std Deviation      0.23754608       Variance                    0.05642814
 
 
                         bottom 10% in R&D/sales 
                          Variable:  PROFIT_SALES         
              N                         227                     Mean                        0.06253918
              Std Deviation      0.09768586       Variance                    0.00954253
 
 
In contrast with Jaruzelski, we find that the firms with the best profit/sales ratio are the ones that 
invest less in terms of R&D/sales. This result is in relative terms. The result in absolute terms 
shows the same: the firms with the highest profits are the ones with the less R&D/sales ratio. 
This is an interesting result, but of difficult interpretation. We must be very careful in drawing 
conclusions from this. There can be many explanations for such a relationship and the 
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diminishing returns to scale in R&D are not needed to explain it. The lower profits for the most 
R&D-intensive firms can be due to many factors, among them a higher competition in their 
sectors, or to other reasons that are not captured in these simple descriptive statistics. This 
seemingly inverse pattern between R&D and the ratio profits/sales can be a clue for diminishing 
returns to scale, but it could be just a spurious correlation too. We cannot test each single factor 
leading to this result, so the conclusions about that must be left for possible future researchs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4 Limitations 
 
All the analysis above has some limitations. In assessing the success indicators I used just the last 
two values of R&D and investments. As Hall and Scobie (2006) point out, “all the benefits from 
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research done today are not captured and reflected in higher productivity immediately”. They 
claim that we should use longer lags to keep into account it. Alston, Craig and Pardey (1998), in a 
work on the returns to research, stress the same problem. They underline that any restriction on 
the lag length is arbitrary and is equal to assume a rapid obsolescence of R&D. These two issues 
are true, but, in an analysis like ours, adding more lags would worse by much the 
multicollinearity problem. R&D is very autocorrelated and increasing to three the number of lags 
could give results difficult to interpretate.  
 
Furthermore, for R&D we have data for each year from 2001 to 2005, but just once every two 
years from 1995 to 2001. Using three lags would let us analyze just the firms of year 2004 and 
2005, with a serious loss in the sample dimension, further than the problem of multicollinearity. 
A good compromise, given the data we have, is probably using two lags. Obviously, not finding a 
significant relationship in these regressions does not mean that R&D has no effect on profits or 
increase in sales. It just shows that in a short time period (two years) the effects are not strong. 
But if we used a longer lag structure, the effects probably would be even lower (Alston et al., 
1998). Assessing productivity growth using just few lags of R&D makes the estimates of R&D 
larger than their true value (ibid.), as productivity growth could be referred to a limited amount of 
R&D (the expenditures, say, of one or two years before). On the contrary, this productivity 
growth could be due to projects begun many years before. 
 
Another limitation is related to the analysis of the international trade. Fors and Svensson (2000) 
showed that, in Sweden, “the vast majority of R&D is undertaken at home, while most of their 
sales are in foreign markets”. This suggests that technologies developed at home are to a large 
extent exploited abroad. There are some reasons to believe that something similar happens also to 
Norway. The principal reason is that Norwegian wages are very compressed (the 95th top 
percentile in the wage distribution has 55000 NOK per month, the 5th percentile 19000 NOK, 
more than a third of the 95th one) and so the high-educated workers, like the researchers, are 
relatively cheaper in Norway rather than in other countries. This may suggest that the analysis of 
Fors and Svensson can be related to Norway too. This finding can introduce a bias: as our data 
are accounting data, we just have the R&D and sales within Norway. If R&D is performed in 
Norway but the multinational firms have high sales in foreign countries, we may be 
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underestimating the effects of R&D on the succes of a firm. This problem goes in the opposite 
direction of the lag length issue.  
 
Another limitation comes from Prasad (2004), who noticed that there has been a growing process 
of internationalization of R&D, where multinational firms set up their R&D centres in different 
countries away from their home country. We cannot assess this, as we have just the accounting 
data for Norway. So we do not know whether a firm sets up a R&D centre in another country. If 
it happens, we may be overestimating the effect of R&D on success. The opposite problem 
(foreign firms that come in Norway only to perform R&D) is avoided, as in the data cleaning 
phase all the firms that had, in any year, larger R&D expenditures than sales were removed. In 
order to know whether we are overestimating or underestimating the impact of R&D on the 
success indicators we should have more detailed data (in particular R&D for each year, foreign 
sales, foreign R&D centres and, possibly, more years of observations). An analysis of this goes 
beyond the scope of this work, but it could be an interesting development for future research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 Conclusions 
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I have analyzed a dataset of firms operating in Norway covered since 1995 to 2005. As the 
largest part of the literature states (Cohen-Klepper, 1996, Klepper, 1996, Klette-Griliches 2000, 
Klette-Kortum (2001)), I found an almost linear relationship between sales and R&D too, which 
is at odds with Jaruzelski (2005), who found a decreasing relationship.  
 
Sectorial dummies had an important impact in explaining R&D variance across firms, while time 
dummies were not significantly different from zero, but even though showed a decreasing trend, 
according to the descriptive statistics. We also saw the effects of the explanatory variables both 
on the expected invested amount, provided that it is positive, as well as on the probability of 
investing. 
 
Past profits never had a significant impact neither on the invested amount, provided that R&D>0 
(both using GLS and Random Effects), neither on the probability of investing. This gives 
additional strength to the argumentation of Lach-Schankerman (1989) and Lach-Rob (1996) on 
one hand and Kandybin-Kihn (2004) and Wakelin (2001) on the other one. Firms invest in R&D 
for its expected return and, normally, they do not update their expectations in time (otherwise 
past successful research, and then profits, should increase current R&D) as the expected return of 
R&D, the so-called also “effectiveness curve”, is very stable within each firm. 
 
Liquidity, on the contrary, shows some importance, in particular on the invested amount. Both in 
the GLS and in the RE regressions its coefficients was significant, suggesting that liquidity 
constraints can exist in R&D market. It does not have a significant effect, on the other hand, on 
the probability of investing. So, basically, if a firm decides to invest, it does because of higher 
expected returns with respect to its investments and liquidity does not seem a crucial variable. 
But, having invested, a firm can be cash constrained and could be not able to invest as much as it 
would like. Firms in the LI seem to rely more on these financial variables than firms in HI, 
suggesting that they rely more on routines than HI in determining their own R&D expenditures. 
 
We have seen that here it comes the important finding of the foreign dummy: while it has no 
impact on E[R&D|R&D>0], it has a strong negative impact on the probability of investing.  
This makes it unfeasible to run a consistent Tobit regression, but also the two-step Heckman 
procedure has serious problems. The best possible model is then a two-part model, i.e. a probit 
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for the probability of investing and then a regression on the positive R&D. This behaviour of the 
foreign dummy can have important policy implications and can also suggest the existence of sunk 
costs in beginning R&D investments (Sutton, 1991, Santos, 2008). A policy aimed at increasing 
R&D, then, should probably focus more on the sunk part of the costs. On the other hand, the 
clarity of this finding could seem troublesome for the not significant impact of liquidity in 
determining the probability of investing, but one explanation is that a firm may decide to invest 
considering not only the short term liquidity (considered in deciding how much to invest), but the 
long term expected returns and costs of investing in R&D. If this is the case, it is logical to find 
that liquidity has an impact on the invested amount but not on the decision whether investing or 
not. 
 
I analyzed then the relationship between R&D and physical investments. I have found, according 
to Lach-Schankerman and Lach-Rob, that past R&D can explain an important part of current 
investments, while the opposite does not hold. We can think to R&D as a random innovation 
process that, when a successful innovation occurs, in order for it to be profitable, must be 
embodied in physical capital.  
 
I also moved my attention from the explanations of R&D to the effects of R&D. Unfortunately 
the dataset did not have any measures of productivity of R&D (for example, patents), so I had to 
analyze the relationship between R&D and sales growth or profits, without having an 
intermediate measure of innovation. R&D did not show a solid behaviour in increasing the 
performance of the firm. The only relationship that was found was with increase in sales, but not 
with profits nor increase in profits. In the high-investing sector there seems to be a somewhat 
stronger positive relationship between R&D and firm's success indicators, but rarely statistically 
significant. At least in the short term, as Jaruzelski states, “success cannot be bought”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 1: R&D regression, HI-LI Random Effects regressions 
 
High- investing sectors: 
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Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       373 (123 firms) 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0401                    between = 0.2116          overall = 0.0822  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
             R&D |      Coef.        Std. Err.        z       P>|z|      [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     profitdlag1 |  -.0074533   .0161604    -0.46   0.645     -.039127    .0242204 
      salesdlag1 |   .0158834   .0040821     3.89   0.000     .0078826    .0238843 
   moneydlag1 |  -.0131537   .0086489    -1.52   0.128    -.0301052    .0037978 
           foreign |   23602.51   23256.61     1.01   0.310    -21979.61    69184.63 
             d1997 |   28057.88   12928.43     2.17   0.030     2718.619    53397.13 
             d1999 |   13115.53   12977.86     1.01   0.312    -12320.61    38551.67 
             d2001 |   10544.75   11854.42     0.89   0.374     -12689.5    33778.99 
             d2002 |  -3651.969   11677.26    -0.31   0.754    -26538.97    19235.03 
             d2003 |  -4726.596    11413.2    -0.41   0.679    -27096.06    17642.86 
             d2004 |   378.6389   11754.29     0.03   0.974    -22659.36    23416.63 
              _cons |    21393.9   13371.53     1.60   0.110    -4813.822    47601.62 
------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Low-investing sectors: 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =      1131 (402 firms) 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0109                        between = 0.6720        overall = 0.4837   
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         R&Dd |      Coef.         Std. Err.      z         P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   profitdlag1 |   .0023235    .002455       0.95   0.344    -.0024881    .0071351 
    salesdlag1 |   .0047043    .000248      18.97   0.000     .0042182    .0051904 
 moneydlag1 |   .0052266   .0006622      7.89   0.000     .0039288    .0065244 
         foreign |   3431.622   3642.165      0.94   0.346    -3706.891    10570.13 
           d1997 |   1369.218   1721.402      0.80   0.426    -2004.667    4743.104 
           d2001 |   -2729.61   1687.726     -1.62   0.106    -6037.492    578.2723 
           d2002 |  -2607.076   1748.561    -1.49   0.136    -6034.192    820.0411 
           d2003 |  -1395.782   1759.568    -0.79   0.428    -4844.471    2052.907 
           d2004 |  -1934.631   1786.709    -1.08   0.279    -5436.517    1567.254 
           d2005 |  -1083.305   1834.154    -0.59   0.555    -4678.181    2511.571 
           _cons |   6937.753   1957.993      3.54   0.000     3100.158    10775.35 
----------------+----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Appendix 2: Probability of investing, HI-LI 
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High-sector: 
Marginal effects after probit 
      y  = Pr(antall_fou) (predict) = 0.70689085 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    variable |      dy/dx         Std. Err.      z         P>|z|        [    95% C.I.   ]           X 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  pr~dlag1 |    3.19e-07      .00000       1.86     0.063       -1.7e-08  6.6e-07     41100.1 
 omsdlag1 |    4.20e-08      .00000       1.17     0.242       -2.8e-08  1.1e-07     939821 
moneyd~1 |  -1.31e-07      .00000      -1.91     0.056       -2.7e-07  3.2e-09    -32110.4 
    foreign*|  -.2741765      .08784      -3.12     0.002      -.446337 -.102016   .258621 
      d1997*|   .1022135      .06354       1.61     0.108      -.022327  .226754   .122414 
      d1999*|  -.0034989      .07665      -0.05     0.964     -.153721  .146724   .117241 
      d2001*|  -.0110713      .06571      -0.17     0.866     -.139865  .117723   .160345 
      d2002*|    .012208       .05894         0.21     0.836     -.103321  .127736   .177586 
      d2003*|   .0385301      .05877        0.66     0.512     -.076649   .15371    .184483 
      d2004*|   .0152951       .0442         0.35     0.729     -.071339  .101929    .12931 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Low-sector: 
Marginal effects after probit 
      y  = Pr(antall_fou) (predict) = 0.53212854 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    variable |    dy/dx          Std. Err.     z      P>|z|      [    95% C.I.   ]          X 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  pr~dlag1 |   3.33e-07       .00000    1.78   0.074    -3.3e-08  7.0e-07     38854.8 
 omsdlag1 |   9.22e-08       .00000    3.41   0.001     3.9e-08  1.5e-07      828797 
moneyd~1 |  -7.76e-08      .00000   -1.17   0.243    -2.1e-07  5.3e-08    -56193.6 
    foreign*|  -.0581538     .05138   -1.13   0.258    -.158855  .042547   .184169 
      d1997*|  -.0705581     .03708   -1.90   0.057    -.143226   .00211    .149165 
      d1999*|  -.1736018     .03733   -4.65   0.000    -.246775 -.100429   .110581 
      d2001*|  -.0719919      .03225   -2.23   0.026   -.135194  -.00879    .165076 
      d2002*|  -.1018752      .0313   -3.25   0.001     -.16323 -.040521     .160302 
      d2003*|   .0067492      .02823    0.24   0.811    -.048585  .062084   .15712 
      d2004*|  -.0010853      .02246   -0.05   0.961   -.045108  .042937   .130867 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Appendix 3: R&D/sales regression, Random Effects 
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Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =      1507 
Group variable: org_nrn                         Number of groups   =       525 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0540             between = 0.1551                 overall = 0.1851 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      fou_sales |      Coef.   Std. Err.             z       P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    profitdlag1 |  -8.22e-09   5.56e-09      -1.48   0.139    -1.91e-08    2.68e-09 
      omsdlag1 |   4.18e-11   6.11e-10       0.07    0.945    -1.16e-09    1.24e-09 
  moneydlag1 |  -1.90e-09   1.69e-09     -1.12    0.261    -5.22e-09    1.42e-09 
          foreign |   .0196708   .0083977     2.34    0.019     .0032116      .03613 
       chemical |   .0243902   .0136868     1.78    0.075    -.0024355    .0512158 
  office_cm~r |  -.0664212   .0358263    -1.85   0.064    -.1366394     .003797 
  electric_a~s |   .0357636     .01663       2.15    0.032     .0031694    .0683578 
  radio_comn |   .0965225   .0179911     5.37    0.000     .0612607    .1317844 
   medical_pd |   .0609496   .0181012     3.37   0.001     .0254719    .0964274 
   sea_transpt |   .0413294   .0180987     2.28    0.022     .0058565    .0768022 
post_telecom |   .0348776   .0178586     1.95   0.051    -.0001245    .0698798 
data_proce~g |   .1056897   .0141832     7.45   0.000     .0778911    .1334882 
            d1997 |   .0087397   .0040357     2.17   0.030     .0008299    .0166494 
            d1999 |   .0060639   .0042603     1.42   0.155    -.0022861    .0144139 
            d2001 |   .0043173   .0035988     1.20   0.230    -.0027363    .0113709 
            d2002 |   .0024437   .0036429     0.67   0.502    -.0046963    .0095838 
            d2003 |   .0074101   .0035805     2.07   0.038     .0003925    .0144277 
            d2004 |   .0037365   .0034529     1.08   0.279    -.0030311    .0105041 
            _cons |   .0093818   .0079166     1.19    0.236    -.0061344     .024898 
----------------+------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 4: Effects of R&D, HI-LI 
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High-investing sectors: 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       120 (59 firms) 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1741           between = 0.0194              overall = 0.0434 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
profitabil~d |      Coef.       Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    foudlag1 |   1.558066   .8213446     1.90   0.063    -.0866479     3.20278 
    foudlag2 |   1.233069   .7357252     1.68   0.099    -.2401948    2.706334 
    invdlag1 |   -.1924995   .126459    -1.52   0.133    -.4457293    .0607303 
    invdlag2 |   .1716694   .0987467     1.74   0.088    -.0260675    .3694063 
         _cons |    36818.07    43251.4     0.85   0.398    -49791.37    123427.5 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(58, 57) =    15.44              Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
 
Low-investing sector: 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       338 (173 firms) 
R-sq:  within  = 0.6122              between = 0.0013          overall = 0.0868 
                                                                   F(4,161)           =     63.53 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.7010                            Prob > F           =    0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
profitabil~d |      Coef.        Std. Err.       t       P>|t|      [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    foudlag1 |   .1347367   1.470934     0.09   0.927    -2.770076    3.039549 
    foudlag2 |  -1.780081   .6818795    -2.61   0.010    -3.126662      -.4335 
    invdlag1 |  -.7235185   .1979282    -3.66   0.000    -1.114389   -.3326483 
    invdlag2 |   .7938411   .1610583     4.93   0.000     .4757818      1.1119 
        _cons |    54396.3      32230.9      1.69   0.093     -9253.53    118046.1 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(172, 161) =     2.57            Prob > F = 0.0000 
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